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0 U ':' L I H E 
A Introduction 
I Generril charac teristics of each in method 
(a) Spinoza ' s ideal rationalism 
(b) Berkeley ' s i deal empir icism 
I Method 
A Spinoza 
1 . Faith in the omni potence of reason and 
in the scientific method of Galil ee. 
2. Repudiation of the inductive method as 
g iving only abstractions. 
3 . Searc h for a n al l inclusive hypothesis . 
(a) Substanc e 
4 . F~plicit statement of the object i ve essence 
o~ the fountain'l-)ea d o~ his ded uction. 
(a) Attributes (idea and its object) 
5 . Inad equac y of ded uct i Ye method t o determine 
what the r:orld is. 
6 . 
7. 
(a) Reco urs e to empiricism for disco very 
o~ modes. 
Repudiat i on of teleology i n eXlJlanaticn of 
.-
universe . 
Criticism 
(a) Inadequacy of method cf pure rationalism 
(b) To drive concept of t el eo l ogy from 
science not necessarily to drive the concept 
from phi losophy. 
B Berkeley 
~\~:-'\~~ 
~\S) 
\ '\~ .~ ~\. 
~'!'@._ 
1 . Scrut i ny of man 's knowledge and its 
sources . 
2. Adop tion of method of empiric i sm - study 
o~ sense perception. 
(a) Abstr~ ct ideas meaningless 
I 
3. Search for ult imate reality back of 
sense percepticns . 
4 ~ Critic i sm of mechanical philosophies 
with their postulate of mater i a l substa nce 
as ultimate reality . 
(a) Their province only realm of instrumental 
causes . 
(b) Po stulates shut out most worthwh i le 
facts of experience . 
(c) Do not solve phenomena but explain 
phenomena by other phenomena. 
5 . Inadequacy of empiricis m to g i ve external 
bodies 
(a) Recourse to reason to lead to the 
knowled~e of the cause of phenomena . 
6 . Inc :c easinQ'ly important place P:iven by 
Berkeley to reason . 
'7 . Elements of pure rationali sm in BerkelP.y ' s 
et hical theory. 
II Epistemology 
A Berkeley 
1. Theory of knowledge 
(a) Empiric i sm leads him to the theory of 
monism. 
I Object a nd sensation the same . 
(b) Feeling toward theory of obje ctive 
reference of ideas. 
I External v-v i th regard to origin . 
II Do not cease to exist when not 
i n my mind. 
III Nature the v7orkmanship of v1ise 
and ?OCd agent . 
(c) Later recognition that we can kno~ spirit 
alt'hcu~h we have no "idea" of it leads to 
his th eory of "noticns" - a step towards 
an objective th eory of knowledge . 
II 
2. Criterion of ~ruth - In broad experience -
co herenc e 
( a ) Rejects tradition, personal prejudice 
and universal acceptance. 
(b) Sense percepti on. 
I Ideas of sense distinct, 
orderly and coherent. 
II Meaning discovered by experience . 
(c) Conscious ness 
I Intuition - cannot pretend to 
demonstrate . 
( d) Inferences from sense exparience 
I Intelligible 
II Consistent 
III Comprehensive 
( e) Moral Truth 
I Universal laws by infallible 
ind l1C ti ens o-:: reason 
II Pa rti c ulars by pragmatic test 
(f) Religious Belief 
I Probability th e gQide of faith 
B Spinoza 
1. Theory of Knowledge 
(a) Uncritical experience leads him 
to the postulate of dualism 
I An idea a~rees with its object 
(b ) Rationalism leads to the explanation 
ther8of that they are both only 
aspects of one reality - the doctri ne of 
parall elism--
I II 
(c) Confusion betwe en thought-object 
and psycho-physiological paralle~ism 
in attempt to reconcile aprior i theory 
and facts of experience. 
2 . Criterion of Truth - logical co~ency i n the 
scrutiny of thought 
III Metaphys ics 
(a) Inadequate ideas false 
I Realm of imaginntion 
II Mind passive 
(b) Adequate ideas 
I Represent the essence of thinRs 
II Mind active 
III Clear and distinct - have to be 
believed 
(c) Logical co gency re1)roduc es the order 
of natural necessity 
I Right ordering o-': adequ.a te ideas 
const itutes intellect 
A Berkeley 
1 . Discovers two kinds of reality 
(a) Ideas whose esse is percipi 
I Can discover no such thing as 
material substance - either as "ab-
stract" matter or substratum of 
sense q uali ties 
(b) Spirit whose esse is perc i pere 
2. Deductively from experience o~ ideas and 
sel~ as spirit comes to belief in 
(a) Other finite spirits 
(b) Supreme Spirit 
3. Interpretation of cat egory of causation 
(a) Concrete power spiritual 
IV 
(b) Connection of ideas not cau se 
and e~fect but sign and thing s ig-
nified 
I Nature a Divine language . 
4 . Belief in existence of God as supreme 
infinite Spirit amon~ finite s~irits. 
(a) Reasons ~or belief in ex istenc e 
I Cannot argue from id ea of God 
II No intuitive knowledge 
III Consci ence supp oses the being 
of a Go d 
IV Must exist as cause of t he 
phenomena of nature 
V Must exist as mind in which 
ideas may eternally reside 
VI By analogy of inference from 
s oc ial communication to belief in 
existence of finite spirits may 
from nature (Divine language ) infer 
existence of supreme spir it. 
(b) Interpretation of nature of God 
I The Nature c: the Supreme being 
the im~ortant thing 
II Reasons for belief in His wisd om , 
good Dess and po~cr 
A Orderliness and harmony of nat ure 
B St ruct tlre and use of bi ol op ical 
phenomena 
I II God as imma nent 
IV The attributes of God t o be 
interpreted a s analagous to but 
infi nitely mo r e perfect than those 
of man . 
V No idea of God better or mcl"P e..d~qaa te 
than the Chri stian id ea . 
v 
5. Finite persons 
(a) Early empirical theory of mind -
a congeries of perceptions 
I Mind or spirit but the concrete of 
will and understanding 
II Soul only a complex idea - existence, 
willing and percepticn 
(b) Breakinp: away from early method of pure 
impiricism he arrives at different 
dAscription of self and othAr finitA 
persons 
(c) Person one simple undivided acti ve 
being - the true principle of unity, 
identity and existence 
(d) Natrrre of man 
I Capable of noble things 
B Spinoza 
1 . By purely apriori reasoning formulates 
theory of one kind of reality 
(a) Substanc e , self caused; necessarily existent 
and in finite 
2. Definition - Postulate of attributes 
(a) Thought 
(b) Extension 
(c) Theory of parallelism 
3 . Interpretation of category of causation 
(a) Each mode has its ef~icient cause in 
some other mode 
(b) All is determined by the nature of 
s ubstance as the equal sides .are 
determined by the nature of a tri Rn~le 
v; i t h e q ual an g 1 o s • 
4. Idea of God - Substance with its infinite 
attributes 
VI 
IV Ethi cs 
(a) Nature of God 
I Infinite and perfect 
II A thinking being 
III Free but not exercising choice 
IV Attributes not analagous to 
those of man 
5. Finite Persons 
(a) As modes of one substance, no independent 
ind i v id uali ty 
(b) Mind active in so far as it has 
adequate ideas 
(c) Theoretically but detached ideas 
(d) Impliedly a conscious center of 
activity 
(e) Nature of man 
I By self expression he can 
reach excellence 
II By pas s ivity he becomes prey to 
his pa. s ~ ~ ions 
A Berkeley 
1 . Early consideration of ethics as a 
demonstrative science 
2. Formulaticn of an empirical science of 
ethics - hedonism 
(a) Pleasure and self- regard the supreme 
motives of human conduct 
(b) Sensual pleasure the summum bonmn 
3. Strikes at the root of hedonism-
(a ) Builds llp scale of pleas t1res on 
qllalitative bGsis 
VII 
I Scale of val t1es 
Low place to sensual pleas ur e s 
Hi ~h value placed on reason and 
the rel i~iotls valt1es 
4 . Sets tlp an absoltlte standard of valt1es 
(a) The supreme good 
. 
I Not temporal happines s 
II The well being of all 
5 . His interpretation of mdral laws 
(a) Moral laws - universal divine laws 
(b) Tendency to oromote happiness of all 
(c) God the solution of the problem of 
altruism vs egoism 
(d) The idea o: virtue 
6. The Problem of Evi l 
(a) Imperfections in nature have their u.ses 
(b) General laws of nature Stlited to promote 
well being o¥ creation 
(c) The value of havi ng a rational universe 
overbalances the evil of the calamities 
that arise from having nature take its co urse . 
(d) Particular inconveniences arise from 
casual combinations of events and voluntary 
motions of animals 
(e) ':1he re~Jl problem not adequatel~l realised 
(f) Immortality the solt1tion o~ the pr cblem 
7. The Problem of Freedom 
(a) Free ~V ill maint · ~ ined on thr ee gro tuds 
I We think YJe are free 
II ~he conception of blame implies 
freedom 
III Not to maintain it would t1nhinge 
the principles of morality. 
VIII 
B Spinoza 
1. His rationalism leads him to mainta in that 
good and evil express no positive quality 
of things . 
2. Vo l Lm tar is t 
(a) Objects of our desire we call good 
3. Assumpt ion that there is some human good so 
sure and permanent that it can make life good . 
4 . The supreme good 
(a) To know absolutely infinite being. 
5. The Problem of Evil 
(a) Does not exist - nothing can be set 
donn to a flaw in nature. 
(b) Everything endeavors to persist in its bP.inf 
(c) Pain, when 8ndeavor baf~lAd 
(d) Ple !:'c s ure when sat is fie d 
(e) Sin - disobedience to laws of state 
6. The idea or virt lle 
7. The Problem o~ Freedom 
B Conclusion 
(a) Determinism 
(b) Notion of contingency a fiction 
(c) No center of activity in man 
'J.'J.le in2dequ acy of -pure empi r icism or absolute rationalism 
alone as a ~netho1 of nhiloso>1hy 
The Plernents ,,.hich must be contributed by each 
George Berkeley and Benedict de Spinoza employed 
very different methods of approach to the problems of 
philosophy, - Spinoza, in the main, a deductive; Berke-
l ey, an inductive method . Spinoza ' s ideal was the ideal 
of rationalism; Berkeley's, of empiricism. How far each 
was able to hold to his ideal; and to what extent he con-
sciously or unconscic·usly deviated from it will be sug-
gested l ater . The plan of this paper is to out line the 
solutions of the more important philosophical problems 
worked out by each philosopher, with an examination of 
the method by which each arrived at his conclusions . 
Spinoza inherited t he naive faith of the Greek 
philos ophers in the omnipotence of reason and, to use a 
phrase of Bertre nd Russell's, the "medieval beliPf in the 
tidiness of the universe." The classical tradition that 
"apriori reasoning could reveal otherwise und'iscoverable 
secrets about the universe and could p rove reality to be 
quite different from what to direct observation it ap-
pears to be"* found the apriori deductive method of geometry 
its fi ttinr instrument . 
Spinoza's age, however, was a scientific a ge, an 
ag e that was f eeling the full force of the impetus given 
to scientific investigation by Gallleo. J!1ollowing Des -
cartes, Spinoza belongs to that period of philosophy when 
men were strenuously determined tc. see self and the world 
* Bertrand Russell Scient iflc· Me thod Page 5 
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as they really were, - an age of philosophical naturalism. 
His was an age tha t believed that nature is a mechanism, 
that human reason is competent to grasp the truths of 
nature , and that the scient i fic method of Gali l ee is the 
key to these truths . 
There were , of course , two parts to the method of 
Gal i lee ,- the clearly thou~ht hypo t hes i s , and its verifica-
t i on or testing by concrete ex~er iment. The second part of 
Gal ilee's method , the testing of the h;Tpo thes is b ~,r concrete 
experienc e, has no pla c e in Spinoza ' s method. The cleArly 
thou ~ht hypothesis is the natural result of his inheri -
tance and age ,- an a ge that bRl i e ved tha t i f one "co u.ld 
by good luck guess a t the one absolute law of l 8W S as 
Gali l ee had guessed at the law of the falling bodies", one 
\·:ould then have "an hypothesis whe reof every f:~ ct of physi-
cal n r. ture would be a verification" : The i dea of the 
clearly thcu ght hypothesis of Galilee was famili a r in the 
hypotheses of geometry. If one could onc e ge t na ture's 
laws in mind as Euclid got his axioms , "then all the facts 
of nature down to the l east wo uld become as clear , as 
certain , as demonstrable as Euclid ' s theorems are to the 
student of mathemntics . "* 
Spinoza specifically repudiates the inductive method. 
He does not start from paLticulars and wo r k to un i versals . 
Such universals, abstrnctions as he termea them, were for 
* Josiah Royce The Sp i r i t of Modern Philosophy Pages 39 and 40 
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him mere ••fab r icati ons o f thou ~ht, ma -le un out of ac c i len t a l 
rPoetit i an s o f e . ~erience , shrP i S of mu tilat Pi ~P r ce~tio~ , 
havi ng no relatior to t h e nature of thirr.; s . "·:i-1 "The Ps sen8es 
0 "' L ~articular mut eb l P thin ~s , " he ma i r t e i n e J , 11 e re n ot to 
be gathere ..~. fr·o.n t he ir seri e s or order of e xis tenc e '!-"hi ch 
w o~L..~. turnl bh us ~it h nothing b Pyoni the i r e x t ri ' sic je -
no~iTPtiors , t hP i ~ rP l a tio ns , or , at most, their c i r cumst ~ nces, 
Rll n~ -hi8 h are ver y li~f'Fr ~n t from t h r i r i n~ost essen ce. 
Their i n most essence mu st be sought s olely f r om f'ixei a nd 
etern al things.":<-·1, For iiscovery in nature he reliPl on a 
our e ly j e duc ti ve me thoi~ t he sou rce or the ieduct i on t h e 
iefini ti on o ~ Go , or i nf i nite subs t Pnce . The cause of' nhilos -
oohers ' i nconsisten t ioc trines, he maintai n s , is t he ~Bat that 
they io not keeo to t he nroner cr i e r of ~hi losonhic thi rk i ng . 
"The natur e or Go l , whi ~ h s ou l i be re f -le ct ed on fi rst, inas-
much AS it is ryri'Jr both in t he or1er of' kr owlelg e an d t h e 
crie r or natu r e , they ha ve tPken ta be last i r the o r . ~r of 
kr owledg P , end have nut i n to t he ~ ir s t nlace ~ha t t hey call 
t h e obj e...;t::. of s en ::;,at ior. ; il. en ce , n 1ile t he y are consiierin g 
11BL~I" & L pflEnomena tne y s ive no atten ti oi at a l l to t he -:iiv i n e 
n~ t~rP, Pri , ~h e n e~tPr~erls t hey an~ ly the ir ~in J to t h e st Ji y 
o "' t:"1P ·1i v ir.P r P t.u rr' , t r1e y ar e qu itP un8b l e to bear i r. mi nl the 
Cirst hynot heses with whi ·~ h t he ·r have ove r l Pi :i t he knovr l edge 
' .. 
1 Spin oza - Mart i neau 12 3 
~~;;~. On the Imoroveant of the Un :1erste nd i ng 3 7 
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of natural phenomena , inasmuch as such hypotheses are 
*' no help t owards understanding the Divine nature . " 
In order to remove out of the way all confused ideas , 
recourse must be had to Definition , the best basis for 
drawing a conclusion ; the most fruitful method of dis -
covery being to form thoughts from some adequate defini-
tion. In framing the det"ini tion of the fO Trltainh.ead of 
our deduction no predicates must be admitted except those 
from wh ich the essence of really existing things necessarily 
*2.. ( follo~. Relying then en this principle that did we 
pick up the properties first, as experience presents them , 
we should never secure the essence, but once possessed 
of t he essence as given i n its cause , we see how the pro -
perties branch out from this stem) Sp i noza makes it a 
·'crucial test o~ the true essenc e having been fcund that 
from our de f inition all the other properties can be de-
.. 
. duced. 
Having , then, determined upon his method and determined 
upon an all-inclusive postulate or hypothesis, he must 
make his definition . The rigid mathem.<:ttical form of Spinoza's 
Ethics tends to conceal the fact that he is ever and 
again turning to the facts of experience for the next step 
in his system , that his assumptions are often tacit a ppe als 
to experience. Nor must we assume that he was himself 
I ~Ethics II Proo . X Corel. Note 
* On the Improvement of the Understanding Pages 34 and 35 
- Sryinoza 120 
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unaware o~ t~is empirical element in his p~ilosophy . 
"My assumptions , " he said, "are based on postulates, wh i ch 
I 
re s t almost without exc eption on experience . " * The data, 
then , that Spinoza takes from experience as the initial 
pos tulates in the deve lopment of hi s system are two, -
a world of external realities E1.nd the knOi'iledge of this 
wo rld, - an idea of the object and the object knoWI1 · The 
basis o f his ratiocinations , he says , is notions common t o 
all men ; notions clear and distinct to those who are un-
shackled by prejud i ce. He a s sumes, thAn, the common notion 
that the idea is othe r than the thing so that the same 
p redicates cannot be affirmed of both and that yet they 
ltave a point of union in the essence of the t r i n~ which is 
pre s ent ob j ectively i n the one and formally in the other . 
In thi s c onception of a s ingle essence r:ith its attribu.tes 
Spino~a brid~es th e gulf be t ween thin~ s and thou~ht; he 
takes it for granted that the y communicate and thus sets 
up a doctrine of nB t, ~rfll dualism . 
As applied to matters of experienc~ deducti on, taken 
ap r iori, s'bows the "poss ibility of hitherto u.nsus pected 
alternatives" mo re oft en than the "impossibility of alter-
natives which seemed prima facie possible. Thus while it 
liberates i mag ii1h ti on as to what the world .MAY be, it re -
fuses to legislate as to wha t the world IS . " *-< Having 
I 
* Ethics II 17 Carol. note 
* Bertrand Russell Scienti f ic Method Page 8 
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thus set up a conceptual universe, having secured the 
essence of existence apr i ori , his doctrine of mo des is 
a gain a resalt of his €mpir i cism. His doctrine of sub -
stance could never deductively yield the concrete modes 
of the world that IS. Having, however , secl.U'ed the essence 
of existence apriori , we are to examine the manifesta-
tions of substanc e in the modes empirical ly , not of course 
to learn anything about i ts essence but only sequence of 
events, etc., correcting the concl us ions drawn from ex-
perience by our apriori definition of the essence of the 
universe. I t is in the realm of modes that we see the scientific 
aspect of Spinoza's thought. 
It was inevitable that since Spinoza identified 
God and substanc~ all manifestations of God, (identified 
with modes) must , if he was to be consistent, receive a 
scientific explanation , and since he did not admit pur-
pose in the ground of the universe teleology must be 
banished from science. Echoes of the strife between chur<h -
men and the naturalists are heard in now and then a passage 
in the Ethics. "One who seeks for the true causes of 
miracles and strives to understand natural phenomena as 
an int elligent being and not to ga ze at them like a fool 
*' is set down and denc•unced as an impious heretic." When 
men are ignorant of the scientific explanation of na tural 
*
1 Ethics I Appendix Page 78 
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phenomena, they "take refuge in the will of God - in other 
*' words, the sanctuary of ignorance." They lay down as 
"an axiom th•1t God's judgments far transcend human under -
standin~. Such doctrine miG1:ht well have sufficed to con-
ceal the truth fro m the human race for all eternity if 
mathematics had not furn i shed another standard of v e:city 
in cons idering solely tl1e es s ence and properties of figures 
~ ithcut regard to their final causes . " *~ 
One criticism of Spinoza's method has already bee n 
not ed,- - namely tha t aprior i reasoning may liberate the 
i magination as to what the wor ld MAY be, but it refuses t o 
legislate as to what the ~orld IS. Pure rationa l ism, or 
apriorism cannot yield necessar i ly valid infL~ rmation about 
th e wo:rld of our experience . Criticism of the kind of 
explanat ion yielded by Soinoza's system , criticism of his 
postulates, as well as criticism of the inadequacy o f his 
system to account ~or many of the facts of experience 
are ~urnished by Berkeley hims elf in his cr i ticism of 
mechan ical philosophies and will be noted later. Spinoza's 
insi s tence t hat the concept of teleology be driven from 
t~e ::ield of science was a s t ep needed in his a ge , in the 
field of science. Sc ience could no t progress as long as 
it was shackled by that concept. Spino za himself made t~e 
distinct i on that scienti~ic knowledge was not a knowledge 
~ Ethics I Appendix Page 78 
*~Ethics I Appendix Page 77 
- 7-
of the real essence of the universe. To drive the concept 
of teleology from the field of science it WAS not necessary 
to drive the concept of purpos e from the ground of the 
uni verse . 
(L 
Berkeley's method is the posteriori , inductive method 
"-
o~ empiricism. His was an age that was beginning to inquire 
very specifical ly vvhat man 's knov•ledge was and as to its 
sources . 
Berkeley very_ early settled on experience as the 
' source of human knowledge,* and scrutinizing the abstract 
metaphysics of the schoolmen found it built of meaning less 
words , abstract ideas that were neither concrete data of 
sense, nor c oncrete data of i nward consciousness·. He found 
the concepts of abstrac t matter, abstract subst ~ nce , ab-
stract power meani ngless; the is s ue of unlawful a nalysis , 
which pretends to f ind what is real v;i thout the concrete 
:l, 
ides s that make the real .* General ideas are only particular 
ones applied in common to an L1de finite number of t: Ji n gs 
w.1ich r es emble one ac1other. Every thL1g which exists, he 
maintains, is particular.~ 
Berkeley, then, begins as an emp i ricist ; his material 
t'rJ.e ideas of sense nnd of reflection . He very soon recog-
nizes, however, that these ideas of sensation and reflection 
are not ultimate and he attempts to get back of the ideas 
*'commonplace Book 18 
~Commonplace Book 7, 10, 18, 20, 21; 1st Dial. 386, 404 
~1st Di al . Page 403 
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to the deeper reality. Like Spinoza he attempts to single 
out the essence of reality, but unlike Spinoza he does 
not find it in material substance . 
Berkeley states very carefully his criticism of those 
systems of philosophy whi ch fi nd the essence of reality 
in mat erial substance . There are three main reasons why 
he cannot accept the conclusions of mechanical philosophy 
as final. In the first place its province is only the 
realm o~ secondary or instrumental causes, - not the realm 
*' of ultimate or real ca~ses. "The mechanical phi lo s opher , 
as hath heen already observed , " says Berkeley, "inquire s 
properly concerning the rules and modes of operation alone , 
and not concernin~ the cause, forasmuch as nothing mechanical 
is or really can be a cause ." *" The mechanical philoso-
pher 'has his ovm 'i:ork . *~ It is t o dis cover the laws of 
nature and to "account for particular phenomena by reducing 
them unde~ or shewing their conformity to, such general 
rules . " It has real value, also,in that it teaches us 
how to act, how to predict the fut ure and regulate our 
. ~ 
lives accordingly .* This is its only sphere • 
In the second place the postulat~ of ultimate reality 
a s material substance, (for of course the mechanical philo-
sopher only post11la tes his rna terial substance, - empiric ism 
*' Siris Sec t 155, 160, 247 Commonplace Book 7, 46 
;
2
·Siris Sect 231, 236 , 249, 252 
+ Siris Sec t 231, 234 
* Siri s Sect 234 
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cannot gi1re external bodies) is an unsatisfactory pos -
tulate in that it shuts out many of the most worth-while 
facts of experience. Systems built up on such postulates 
I 
deny the Yalue of persons , * diminish all the most valua ble 
thins-s - the thoughts, views and hopes of men.'' all the 
knowledge, notion and theories of mind they reduce to sense; 
human nature they contract and deP"rade to the narrow low 
standard of animal life, and assign only a small pittance 
~ 
of t i me instead of immortality. "* I f we may make some 
other postulate concerning ultimate reality than the postu-
late of rna ter i al substanc.e that does not logically deny 
the world of values as well as explaining the world of 
nature, that is the more ·fundamental postulate. 
In the third place mechanic al principles do not solve 
any phenomena at all. They explain p~enomena by other pheno-
mena. Do mechanical philosophers say that "attraction" 
is the cause of certain phenomena . What then, asks Berkeley, 
is attraction. Is attraction itself no t one of the phenomena 
that we look to have expla ined.~ The great men of antiquity 
J. 
resolved gravity into the immediate act of God . * Nor~ 
a postulate of material substance explain phenomena if by 
explaining we mean assigning the real cause, in as mu.ch as 
"all phenomena are to speak truly appearances in the soul 
~ ~ Alciphroni Sect 10 
~ Alciphronr Sect 13 
~ Sir i s 243, 245 , 291 , 293 , 329 
* Siris 246 , 251 
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or mind; and it hath never been explained, nor can it be 
expla ined , how externnl bodies, figures, and notions, 
I 
should produce an appearance in the mind."* 
Berkeley, then, rejects the theory that the essence 
of reality is material substance. He finds that there is 
another element of immediate kno r.'l edge besides ideas, viz. 
s~it.. He finds from experience that in addition to the 
endless variety of ide ns or objects of knoviledge there is 
something which kno~s or perceives them; and exe rcises 
divers operations, as willing , imagining, remembering , 
about them. This percei Ying, active being is what he calls 
mind , spirit, soul, or self. By these words he does not 
denote, he says, any one of his ideas, but a thing entirely 
distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the 
same thing, whereby they are pPrceived; for the existence 
of an idea consists in being perceived . 
So far Berkeley has bee n able to go by the method of 
empiricism. Experience acquaints him with his own ideas 
and hi s own spirit. He a dmits that empiricism cannot 
give him external bodies . "Properly and i mmediately nothi ng 
., 
can be u <? rceived but ideas."* He must ascend from the 
sensible into the i nt elle ct ual i70 rld if he is to ge t beyond 
solips i sm . "Sense and experience," he says, "acquaint us 
with the course and analogy o:f appearances or natura l 
I 
* Siris 251 
*"' 1s t Dial . 418 
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effects. Tho ught , reason , intellect introduce us into 
the knowledge of thei r ca uses. Intellect and r eason are 
' I 
alone the sure guides to t ruth . " "' Berkeley. ho vYever , 
takes his position in the a c t ual universe of applied 
reason; not i n the empty void of abstract reason remote 
from part icul ars and SIJ.ccessi on of change in which no real 
exuer ie nce is fo11nd. Empirical da t a (sense impressions) 
must form the f oundation on wh ich true knowl edge may be 
built .* 
1 
I n his early theor~r Berkeley was \·;illing to g ive very 
little p lace to "reason" in hi s system. In the l ater 
dev e looment of his th ought he g ives it an increasingly 
i mportant place , until he finally maint r~ i r.ts that "as under-
' standing pe rceiveth not , so sense knoweth not";* strictly 
the s ense knows nothing ; we know, understand onl y when 
. ~ . 
we can interpre t a t hi ng ; "' the human mind is clogged and 
bo11rne down by sense i mpressions ; philosophy unbinds the 
l igaments tha t chai n the soul to earth and enables it to 
5 
catch the idea of the sovereign good . * We fi nd , too, such 
expr essions as the "ardent thirst and endeavor of the mind 
(, 
a .fter truth and int 0lle ct ual ideas n; * "the employment of 
. 7 
the mind on things purel y i ntellectual" ; "' "the possibility 
of themos t refined human int ellect exe1ted to its utmost 
I . 
* Siris 264, 295 ~Commonplace Book 9, 23 ; Alciphron I, 11; Siris 292,294,295 , 303 
~ Siris 305 
~ S i ris 253 , 254 
~.Sir is 302 
* Sir is 314 
*
1 Sir is 330 
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reach seizing some imperfect glimpses of the Divine 
ideas abstracted from all things corporeal, sensible 
I 
and imagina ble".* 
Although Berkeley does not recognize the true function 
of the mind in building up knowledge, we can find in his 
later v.r ritings distinct anticips ticns of tho tights worked 
:l.. 
c u t by Kant. He speaks of number as an act of the mind*; 
of the soul as the place of forms ; *' of harmony and pro - . 
J. portion as objects of the pure intellect;* of the t heor ems 
of sc ience as universal intellectua l notions . ~ 
There are, also, in Berkeley's etrrical theory elements 
o f pure rational ism. He searches for the ground of human 
ccnq.uct among the bread principles of reason and no t in 
local cons iderati ons. The moral standard, he insists, may 
be discovered by deduction of reaso n . The mora l ground of 
the u:n.i verse is rational a nd the sys te rn of moral lmvs ma y 
b e deduced by purest reason . 
In epistemolo gy Berkeley, beginning as an empiricist , 
with ideas of sense and of re f lection as his data, is a 
monist . '!! e mu :2. t make no dL: ti nction, he says, between the 
f., 
idea an t1 the percep tion of the idea . * The objects o-: the 
• 
senses , such as sun, moon and s tars, are only sensations in 
our minds - our own ideas . *1 "In truth the object and the 
I *~ Siris 337 
* Sir i s 288 . ~ 
~ Siris 266, 269 
:,. Sir is 303 
,. lst Dial. 382 
* - Commonplace 30 
*, Prins . 94 
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I 
sensation are the same thing . "* Berkeley , in other words , 
treats our who le sense experience as Locke treated the 
secondary qu8lities, - as effects in the individual mind , 
these e ffects not c ·::. used by an independent world of material 
substances but by the Divine will. "Knowledge is entirely 
an internal experience , and ottr sense ideas and their re -
lati ons .... being taken as the i mmedi rc:. te inspiration of the 
Almifo?hty are themselves the only originals we require," 
·'a world of p ure experience i n which one part points cogni-
.. 
tively to other parts , s ays Pringle Pattison,dbut which 
' does not point as a whole teEny extra experiential worl d 
•' . " on which it rests."' That is, Berkeley's epistemology is j ust 
this; 11 tho se things which are im;,1 edia t ely perceivable are 
ideas, and these exist only i n the mind ."* 3 "The house it -
self, the church itse l f, is an idea , i . e . an object - -
J 
immediate object - - of thollght . "* Even thoL1gh Hyl as in-
sists that siP.:ht suggests somet hing of OUTNESS or DISTANCE 
Philonous reaffirms his irrefutable theses that The idea 
or thing which we immediately perceive, neit her sense nor 
reason informs llS that IT actuall y exists without the mind . 
Sight does not sug~est that the visible object we immediate l y 
. 5" perceive exists at a distance. • 
Yet even in this st r ge of his thoup,:ht Berkeley is 
. I 
"' Prins . 5 
*lPringle- Pattison The Idea of God 
*> lst Dial. 421 
"'~Commonp lac e Bcok 9 
~ l st Dial. 412 Commonplace Bock 87 
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117 
struggling toll'l''k theory of ob ,ject i ve reference of ideas . 
How shall he· account for the common belief in the inde-
pendence of ideas and in the existence of the material 
world? Some of our sensations or ideas are not caused by 
. I 
our ovv.c.L will . "' We may then term them external with regard 
to their origin.~ There is another sense in which sens i ble 
objects may be said to be without the mind. If I shut my 
eyes, I do not believe that the object I S DW with my eyes 
open has ceased to exist, but that it exists in some other 
. d _J 
mJ.ll • ..,. That is, there are phenomena which are presented 
to the senses of all mankind, - a ·world which sentient 
bein@:S realise in common. He, too, SL1ggests that ideas 
.\-
have archetypes,* ideas that exist in some other mind , 
but he makes no sug~estion that ldeas have any relation tc 
their arche types. In his early thou~ht, too, he makes the 
su~gestion that the whole creation is the workmanship of 
a wise and Rood a gent , but he does not work out the thPory 
further. In his early theory, in other words , he recognizes 
the fact th :,~ t our knowledge is not merely subjective, but 
he does not succ eed in making his theory recognize or find 
a place for that fact . 
So much for Ber~eley's empirical theory of knowledge . 
He early recognized, hims elf, that oure empiricism cannot 
give extern~l re .:::t li ty and his early empiricism is modi fled 
I ~Commonplace Book 18 , 57, 65 
, Prins. 33 .Prins . 90 
*~ Prins . 90 Commonplace Book 15 
* Prins . 99 
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by an appeal to reason. His early monism , then, is con-
siderably modified in his later wo rks, and in later edition s 
of the earlier works. It i s sig-ni-Picant tha t in t he second 
edition of the Princ iples he omits the statement that the 
object and the sensa tion are the same t hing, and that he 
admits the existence of "notions" - of spirit and the opera-
tions of the mind . An a e ent as suc h, he had not ed in the 
Commonplace Book, cannot be perceived or imagined, - we 
I have no sensuous idea.* In the first edition of the Prin-
ciples(27) and of Alciphron(7-5 ) he maintained tha t we can 
have no ide~ of spirit; that t hose words which denote an 
:J 
active principle do not in a str i ct sense stand ~or ideas.* 
He admits, too, that his theory of knowled 3e, an emp i r i cal 
and subj ect ive t heory, 13annot account for knowledge of 
3 
rational rela tions , actions, and sp irit.• 
Hi s theory o f not io ns, then, is really a step tow~rds 
a dualistic theory of knowledge. 11 It must be own ed", he 
says, .'tthat we have some not ion of so ul , spirit and the 
operations of the mind, such as vlilling, loving, hating 
ina::;much as we know or understand the meaning of these 
.l 
words . "* 
The contL1gent data of our experience in which he 
had such confidence in the early years are in the later 
years felt to b e insufficient and there is a more or less 
*' Commonoln.ce Book ?. 1, .53 , 76 
~ Commonplace Book i 11 , 33 t 35 , 52 Sir is 297 
-~- Sir is 288 , 303 
* Siris 290 Commonplace Book 17 
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conscious grounding o~ the Whole in the eternal and 
i mmutable ideas of reason . Strictly , the sense knows 
I 
nothing . * We perceive indeed, sounds by hearing Bnd 
c haracters by sight . But we are not therefore said to 
2. 
understand them . * "Sense and exper ience acquai nt us 
with the course and analogy of appe c.> rance s and natural 
e f~ects; thought , reason , intellect , int roduce us into 
~ 
t he knowledge of their causes."* The principles of science 
are neither objects of sense , nor imaginntion; intellect 
and reason are alone the sure gui des to truth . 
Berkeley maintains that truth is objective, abs olute , 
. d 
unchangeable and eternal .~ That we may know when we 
have discovered the truth he proposes various criteria, 
chief among them the pragmatic test and the coher ence 
. s 
criterio n . Be specifically r ejects tradi tion~ , personal 
. ~ 
prejudice and universal acceptance* as criteria o~ truth . 
The reluctancy we find in rejecting any opinion can be , 
he Sc1 ys, no argument of its truth . Nor is t he fact tha t 
a no ti on is never so universally and ste~d~astly adhered 
to, anything but a weak argument of its truth to whoever 
considers what n vast number of prejudices and false opin-
ions are everywhe1·e embraced wi th the utmost tena ciouStleSs , 
by the unrefl ect i ng part of manJrind. * 7 
~· .Prins . 18 
~ Siris 253, 254, 264 
,. 1st Dial . 383 
*fAlciphron I - 15 
* Alciphron I - 12 
*" Alciphron I - 12 
*
1 Prins . Sect. 55 
Al ciphron III - 15 
Commonplace Book 14 
Co~nonpl ace Book 14 
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In the matte r of simple perc eption Berkeley maint a i ns 
that we canno t err . "So far as we can in reasoning go 
without the help of s i gns, there we have certain knowledge . "* 
If we will "lay aside words in thinking", ' tis impossible 
:z 
we shall eve r mistake, s ave only in matters of fact ; * t.hat 
is, it seems impos s ible we should be positive and secu.re 
that anyt'hL.1g was tru.e which in tru.th i s not so . Two 
aue s tions arise for Berkeley in connection with ouY sense 
oercepticns. Are t he y produ.cts of our own imagination 
or o£' sense and the constant l aws of nature; and, since 
natu.re is divine langu.age, do we attach the correct mean-
ing to the sign. 
For the distingu.ish lng between the ideas of sense 
and the ideas of imagim~. ti on Berkeley offers the foll ow-
i ng crite r ia . "The idere of Sense are more strong, lively 
and distinct than those of the imagine.tion; they have 
likewise a steadine~s. order, and coherence, and are not 
exci ted at random, as those which are the e f ~e ct of hwman 
wills often ar e , bu.t in a regula r train or s eries . 'nd 
I n the third dialog be tween Hyl&s and Philono u.s, 
Hylas asks how, if me n ju.dge of the reality of things by 
their s enses, a man can be mistaken in thinking the moon 
a plain lucid su.rface, about a foot in diameter; or a 
square tower se Pn at a dist~nce , round. Philonous answers 
I 
\Commonplace Beck 39 
*3 Commonplace 39 
* Prins. Sect . 29 
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I 
that the error is no t in the sense p erception . In the 
case of the moo n , what he immediately perceive s by 
si~ht is cer tainly about a foot in di ameter. The error 
is in the inferences he makes from the p$rcepti cns . Not 
I 
all have l earned the connections betw Nm phenomena ."~· This 
is of course Berkeley ' s famous theory that nature is but 
Di vine langt1age. which vv i 11 be no ted more particularly 
in c onnec ti on with his theory of cause . 
Th e criterion of sense perception, ho wever , he says , 
breaks down when app lied to consciousness . :;.-< Some things, 
Berke ley says in the Commonplace Boo k , we cannot pre te nd 
t o demonstrate but must let stand on th~ir own eviden ce. 
Philonous says, !!If you are resolved to maintain that 
warmth or a gentle de gr~e of heat is no pleasure, I know 
not how to convince you otherwise than by appealinf to 
J 
your onn sense ."* In the same way Berkeley i nsists 
that hP has an intuitive knowledge of his own existence . 
"I know tha t I exist ," he says . "This I know i mmedi ate -
ly or i ntuitively." liThe deduci ng of causes or occasions 
from effects and appearances w! ·, ich alone are perceived 
by sense entir ely relate s to 1· eason . We must trust our 
fac ulties. Ri gh t deductions from true principles v.r ill 
g ive us truth. For inferences from sense experience 
J 
he suggests several criteria. - intell igibil ity, * self-
I 
*2 Sir is 253, 255 
*3 Alciphron Dial. 4, Sect. 4 
*, lst Dial. 387 
*~lst Di al. 381, 387 
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( 
consistency , * comprehens iveness and coherence being 
the most important ones . To assert that which is 
inconceivable or not common sense i s to t a l k nonsens e . 
We should be content to admit that opinion for t rue 
which u-pon examination sholl appear most agreeable to 
common sense and r emote from scepticism . 
The very no ti on or definition of mat eria l substance 
he rAjPc t s bec n us e in such a notion there is a manifest 
repugnan ce and inconsistency . The notion of Spi r it is 
not inconsis tent. It is not inconsistent to say that 
a pArceivin~ t hine shou ld be the subject of i deas, or 
an active thing the ca us e of them. Of his own mind and 
ideas he has an i mmedia t e knowledge end by the help of 
these mediately apprehends the possibility of the exist-
ence of other sp i rits and ideas. "If among various 
opinions about the s ame thi ng, one be grounde d on clear 
and evident reason, that is to be thought true, and 
others orily so fa r as they consist with it . "* 
:2. 
Any theory, too, he says, that does no t t ake into 
account all the f8cts, - va lues amo ng other expe r ience, -
must be false. A theory i s no t true, he sug ~ests, if 
it denies the value of persons . 
Moral truth may be demons trated by the infall ibl e 
deduct i ons of reason. Mora l truths are universal, and 
I *~ Alc iphron I - 15 Alciphron IV - 12 
* A1 ciphron Dial. 1, Sect. 15 
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do not derive their obligations from any civil sanction. 
They necessarily result from the nature of things; that 
is, for BerkelP.y, they are the will of God . "It hath · 
been shewn," says Berkeley, "that God willeth that the 
universal well - being of mankin~ should be promoted by 
the concurrence of ·each particul~ r person; therefore, 
every such practica l proposition necessarily tending the~e ­
to is to be esteemed a decree of God and is consequently 
a law to men ." We may then adopt a pragma tic attitude 
in search for moral truth. The general go od of mankind 
should be regarded as a rule and measure of moral truths , 
of all such truths as direct or influence the moral actions 
of men . * He pr ope ses to free thinkers, that as [1 balance 
to the weight of prejudice they throw into the scale the 
r::reat advant :::ges that arise from the belief of immaterial-
ism. both in regard to religion and human learning. 
In the mat t er of religious beliefs, probability 
is sufficient guide. "There are acne amcngst us that 
d·o not at least think it as probable the Gospel may be 
tr u_e !iS false. But vv'rlen life and immortality ~:;_ re at stake , 
we should play our part with fear and trembling , though 
'twere 100-1 we were cheated in the end ." "Future state 
so comfortable, so just and excellent, so agreeable to 
- the analogy of nature, so u~1 iversnlly credited by all 
* Alciphron Dial. 1, Sect. 16 
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orders and ranks of men, of all nati ons and ages , what 
is it tha t shollld move a fe w- men to reject ." 
It was not until after Spinoza ' s day that the 
probl ems inherent in an objective-theory of knowl edge 
were clearly defined, and we f ind Sp i n oza holdi ng to a 
very uncrit ical dualistic epistemology. His initial 
postul ates as to t he nature of his all-inclllsive Sllb-
stance were tho se of thollp:ht and its object. "An idea is 
the mental concept ion," he s ays, "which is formed by the 
mi nd as a thinking thing ," *' - ·an idea wl, i ch lJas or com-
prehends an object . "A true idea mus t ag ree with its 
object; in o ther words, that ~hich is contained in the 
i n tellect i n representation mus t necessar ily be gr anted 
in nature ."*~ "The extrinsic marks of a t rue idea are 
the a~re ement betwee n the idea and its & ject." *3 
Spinoza's explanation of the agreement between 
an idea a nd its object is of collrse tha t they are both 
only aspec ts of the~ realit y . *u. As Martine~Hl points 
out Spinoza crosses from thollRht to thing only by the 
postlllate tha t the l ogical constitution o~ our conception 
is adeqlla te security for the ac tual constitllt ion of the 
f) 
world .* This c oncepti on of the two known attributes of 
substanc e 1 eads Sui no za to his +'amo us doctrine o f' par <:: llel ism, 
*: Ethics II Def. 3 
• Ethics I Prop. 30 
*
3 Ethics I I Def. 4 Explanation . Ethics I Axiom 6 
*~Ethics III Prop . 2 Note 
*' Study of Spinoza - Martineau, Page 127 
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which will be noted later under the Sllb,ject of his 
metaphysics. Suffice it to say l1ere that "the order 
a nd connection of id eas is t ~e same as the order and 
' connection of things."* "Whatsoever follows from the 
infinite n~ tllre of God in the world of extension fol -
lows withcllt exception in the same order and connection 
<. 
from the idea of God in the wor ld of thcught . "* "Sllb-
stance thinking and Sllbstance extended are one and the 
samP. substance comprehended no v throllgh one attribnte 
and now thrOllP,'h the other. "* 3 ''Thus whether we conceive 
nature under the attribute of e:xtens ion, or under the 
attribute of thcught. or under any other attribute, 
we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain 
of causes; that is, the same things follo wing in either 
.l-
ease ." * 
We have here Splnoza's thought-object parallelism . 
There is a circle, and the idea of a circle , - in thought-
object relation? If so, there seems to be quit e a dif-
ferent parallelism suggested when we come to the human 
b ody and the idea o" the hwnan body . Spi noza does not 
seem to maintain consistently the thought-object rela-
tlon, but frequently changes to a psycho-physiological 
parrrllelism. 
~Ethics II Prop.7 
*)Ethics II Prop.7 Corel. 
*~Ethics II Prop . 7 Corel . 
* Ethics II Prop. 7 Corel. note 
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Pointing to the thqaght-object parallelism be -
tween the idea of the human body and the body we have 
such passages :::t s these . "Whatsoever comes to pass in 
the object of the idea which constitutes the human mind, 
must be perceived by the human mind, or there will 
necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said 
occurrence . That is, if the object of the idea cons titat -
ing the hwnan mind be a body, nothing can take place in 
t hat body without being perceived by the mind . "* ' "The 
idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected 
by ext ernal bodies, must involve the nature of the human 
body and also the nature of the external body . Hence 
it follows that the hwnRn mind perceived the nature of 
& variety of bodies to gether with the nature of its own. · 
It follows that the ide .-:t s. which we have of external bodies 
indicate rather the constitution of oar own bodies than 
~ 
the na tare of exten1al bodies."* 
Pointin~ tc the psycho-physiological parallelism 
we find such passages as the following. "All individual 
things are, though in different de f rees, anima ted ••• • 
thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human 
body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of 
everything else." "Stil l on the other hand, we cannot 
~Ethics II Prop . 12 
* Ethics II Prop. 16, Corel. 1 and 2 See also On the Improve-
ment of.the Understanding P 1 2 
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· ..• 
deny that ideas, like objects differ one from the other, 
one being more excellent than anot her and containing 
more reality, just as the object of one id ea is more 
excellent than the object of another idea . "~ ."I will 
only SBY gen~rally tha t in proportion as any given body 
is more fit ted than othArs for doing many actions or re -
ceiving m~ny impressions at once, so also is the mind, 
of w~ich it is the object, mor e fitted than others ~or 
.:1. forming many simultaneous perceptions . "• "The human 
mi~d can distinctly imagine as many thin~s simultaneously 
3 
as its body cnn f orm images simultaneously."* 
Martineau suggests thHt the object of perception 
is the external body· in immedi ate contac t with t he organ 
of sense. 
Truth, ho·.iever, is not the correspondence of 
concept an d external object - but the r esult of the cogent 
operations o:t' the mind on ideas tha t ccnslst o f t he ob-
j ect ive essences of things . There is nothing positive 
about false or fictitious ideas which causes them to be 
.\-
cal l e d false .* "Falsity consist s in the pri va tion of 
knowledge, whic h inadequate, fragmentary or ccnfused ideas 
involve. "* 5 Some ideas represent only the partial or 
acc id~ntal affections of things. "Every perception has 
~ Ethics II Prop . 13 note 
j Ethics II Prop . 13 not e 
~Ethic s II Prop. 40 note Also see Ethics II Prop. 14 
*5 0n the Improvement o f the Understanding 18, 19 , 23, 4 0 
* Ethics II -Prop. 35 
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for its object either a thing considered as existing 
or solely the essence of a thing . Fiction is chiefly 
I 
occupied with the thing considered as existing."* The 
realm of error is the realm of the imagi:ration . We can 
make a supp osition which we know or assume consistent 
with self ·withcut kncwing the facts on \7hich its actua l 
truth depe nds - an omniscient mind could not err i n that 
it would be incapable of making .~~ supposition of this 
kind. The less we kno w (or know confusedly) the more 
absurd! ties can we accept from the workshop o~ unregulated 
fancy. Mere confictions are confused and won ' t deceive 
us if we analyze them. 
In so far as the mind has inadequate or false ideas 
the mi nd is pa.ssive . I n sc far as we know rather th e 
s t ·:~ t e of our own bodies tb an the nature of external bodies 
Spinoza seems to suggest that the mind i s passive and 
that we have only t he inadequate kno wledge of unreasoned 
exp e rience. Such ideas do not consist of the objective 
essences of things , and the mind is entirely pass ive with 
'l.. 
regard to them.* Fictitious and f alse ideas "originate 
in the i magination , - that is, in certain sensations , 
fortu it ous and disconne ct ed arising not from the pot:er of 
t he mind , but from external causes, according as the hody, 
3 
sleep i ng or waking , receives various motions . "* Sp i no za 
*' On the Improvement o f the Understanding 18 
*: on the Improvement o ·P the Understanding 32, 34 
* On the Improvement of the Understanding 32 
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even suggests that false or fictitious ideas "are often 
I f orme d against our will ."* 
Adequate ideas, on the other hand, represent the 
essence of thin~s. "That which is co mmon to and a property 
of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to 
affect the human body and which is present equally in 
each part of eitheror in the whole, will be represented by 
.7. 
an a dequate ides in the mind . "* "Every idea ·which in us 
3 is absolute or a dequate and perfect is true,"* and in so 
far the mind is active. In so fai as i deas are referred 
t G - tb t * J- • "The h · d h d o oa _ey are rue, 1. e. , _ uman m1n as an a e -
quate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God . "* 
The first step in the search for truth , then, is 
the attainment of clear, distinct, and adequate ideas . True 
ideas are characterised by clearness and distinctness . 
Being true they speak for themselves and have to be be -
lieved. "For the certitude of truth, no further sip-n is 
h 
necessary beyonQ the possess i on of a true idea."* "No one 
who has a true idea is i gnor8nt that a true idea involves 
the highest certainty. What can ther e be more clear and 
more certain than a true idea as a standard of truth. Even 
as li ght displays both itself and darkness, so is truth 
*~On the 
*,Ethics 
*..,Ethics 
*,Ethics 
*'Ethics 
*bOn the 
Impro vement of the Understanding 40 
II Prop . 3 8 and 39 
II Prop. 34 
II Prop . 32 
II Prop. 47 
Improvement of the Understanding 13 and 14 
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a standard both of itself and of. falsity . "* Caird suggests 
that having grasped an idea, "we have only to direct the 
mind ' s operations so as to make the given trqe idea a 
norm according to which we shall understand all things . " 
Having a true idea we know that we have a true idea, 
understand it thorotlghly and "thence forward it is no 
longer used at random unintelligently but becomes a prin-
ciple o~ method or a guide in future inquiries . "*:.~ 
Having then cle s red the mind of all fal s e idea s, 
it is then left with the objective essences of such things 
as have come within its experience. 'The mere sea ttered 
presence of these would not constitute intellect. Under-
standin~ requires that they hold the ri~ht order of con-
.. 
nection and interdependence in our thought. All t hi:i1gs 
which are interconnected, like the objects in nature my 
be understood by the mind, and their subj ective essenc.es 
will maintain the same mutua l rel atic·ns as their object ive 
realities. The order of tho ught reflects the order of 
nature: each mode in the p hysical order follo Y:s from its 
prior; each tho ught will, tlJerefore, be ded ucible from its 
prior , and in t lJ e last resort our "mind must dedu.ce all 
its ideas from t he idea which repres ents the origin and 
- 3 
source of the whole of nature."* The necessity o-f> logical 
*' Ethi cs II Prop. 43 Note 
~-See Caird - Spinoza pa ge 
3 . 
* On the Improvement o f the 
On the Improvement of 
ing 15 
14 On the Improvement 
standing 16 
Understanding 16 
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the Und ers tan d-
of the Under-
co gency reproduces the order of natural necessity . The 
ri~ht ordering of the intfllect within itself will re-
flect the world of na ture. 
i 
In the guest ~or ult i mate rea lity Berkeley holds 
to his idea l of concrete experience. By the method of 
( 
empi ricism he discovers only t wo kinds of reality,* i dea s 
.:/ 
whose es s e is percipi, and spirit whose esse is percipere . * 
I n the K rld of experience he insists there is properly 
no such t Y. i ng as rna ter ial sub stance discoYerable at all . * 3 
Tha t which in common parl ~_mce we know as things, such as 
trees, houses, etc., he f i nds only collections o~ the 
co nc r ete ideas included in those things. Locke had shown 
tha t the primary qualities of objects exist Pd only in the 
mi nd of the percipient; Berkeley goes one step further 
and s~ows t ~at even the secondary qualities hnv e no exist-
._]_ 
ence apart from percipient mind . * It is vain, says Berke l ey, 
to make a distinction betv.·een the intellectual nnd material 
world. Abst r act matter , unindivic1ualisable in sense 
or in imagin~tion must all be void of meaning. As ea rly 
as the Commonplace Book he had begun to question whether 
the substance of bodies or anything else wa s any more 
*0 than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing . 
I *~Commonplace Book 26 
* Commonplace Book 10 
*:lst Dial. Page 381 
~- lst Dial . Pages 398-412 
* Commonplace Book 80. See also 1st Dial. 393,416 
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Berkeley maintains that not only is the concept 
of abstract matter inconceivable but th1:1t this material 
something cannot be a substratum that exists behind 
the ideas, or phenomena or qualities that cause or hold 
I 
them together.* For verification of hi s positi cn, his 
appeal is to experience, to consciousness directly in 
each person's experience. Look into yo ur own thought, he 
-suggests, and se e '1-vhether you can conceive it possible for 
a sound or figure or motion to exist without the mind 
or unperceived, or try to draw an argument "from reason 
for thP existence of what you call real things or mater ial 
2.. 
ob,jects."* 
In experience, too, he finds the other kind of 
3 
re Rlity.* Besides all the Andless variPty of ideas or 
objects of knowledge he discovers that there is something 
which know~them . By these words he does not denote any 
one of his i deas, but a thing entirely distinct from 
them~ wherein they exist, or which is the. same thing , 
whereby they are perceived, for the existence of an idea 
consists in be i ng perceived. We do know what is meant by 
active spirit i n that we know ours elves as spirit , and we 
know what is meant by activity of spirit from our knowledge 
of ourselves causing our OVI.rn ideas. So f ar Berkeley has 
*~ Siris 292 Commonplace Bo ok 37 
~ lst Dial . 391, 416 
Prins . Sect. 2 
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been able to go by strict empiricism. 
Did Berke l ey stop here he mi ght truthfully be 
accused of solipsism , but he goes on from this point 
deductively from the concrete data discovered to a be -
lief in other persons, the existenc e . of a supreme mind 
and to at least a suggestion of an objective world of . 
nature . Strict empirici sm leads only to phenomena . By 
the aid of reason entering the province of the philosophia 
I 
prima we discover another order of beings , * - mind and 
its acts , - permanent being, not dependent but independent , 
containing,connecting , enlivening the corporeal world . 
We are not the cause of many o f our ovm ideas, he 
discovers. Some of our ow11 ideas we can and do cause 
ourselves, others we find impressed upon us . There must 
be some cause for these ideas. I deas we discover to 
be inactive, inert, and therefore not capable of causing 
our ideas . Spirit we know as active, and as able to 
c 2uc: e ideas . * 1. All o Llr i deas are visibly inactive, there is 
nothing of oower or agency included in them, s o that one 
idea or object of thotl.ght cannot produce or make any 
*3 alternation in another. They must, therefore , be caused 
by some other spir i t, and from analogy with our own body 
and self we conclude , or through this means realise , the 
I 
\ Siris 297 
*l Principles Sect. 25 
* Commonplace Book 10 
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existence of other f i nite persons . He also sugr,ests 
that soc ial communication is a criterion of the truth 
o:: the existence of other persons . Nothing so con-
vlnces me of the existence of another person, he says , 
as his speaking to me . * I 
He argues for the existence of a supreme spirit 
on the ground that the material world in order to be a 
real wo rld must needs be continually real i zed and 
regulated by living providence ; and we have all the 
certainty of sense :;nd sanity that there is a mind-
dependent material world, a boundless and endlessly 
evolving sense- symbol ism . Spirit, intelligent and active, 
thus becomes the basis of Ber ke ley's philosophy . 
We ma y note here Berkeley ' s interpretat io n of the 
category of causation. f.T e must distinguish careful l ~T . 
2. he says, between two kinds of causes,*- physical and 
spiritual, the former more properly called occ asions , 
the latter being the OHly e fficient caus es . The 'con-
nection of ideas does not imply the rel at ion of cause 
and effect, he maint r, ins, but the relation of a mnrk or 
3 
sign with the thing signified . * The fire wh ich we see 
is no t t he cause of the pain we suffer upon our approaching 
i t , but the mark that forewarns us of it. When we per-
*' Alciphro n IV - 6 
*l commonulacA Book 55 
*3 Prins.~Sect . 65 
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eel ve ce:..~tain ideas of sense constantl y fol lowed by othe r 
ideas and know that we are no t the cause of the ideas we 
attribute pov1er a..>'ld a gency to the ideas themselves and 
make one the cause of the other . This is absurd and 
unintelligibl e . There i s no proof either from experi -
I 
ment* or reason of any other agent or effic i ent cause 
J. 
than mind or.sp irit . * One of his early notes is to the 
3 
effe ct that there can be no power v7 ithout volition. * The 
material '::orld in itself is wholly pov:erless; all changes 
in n~ ture &. re a ccomplished by sp irit. Concrete power 
like concrete substance is spiritual . 
We may note here Berkeley ' s famous i nt erpretation 
of nature c: s Divine language. Visible nature is a lan-
guage in which the universal power that is continually 
at work is speaking to us all in a way simi lar to that 
*<l-in which our fellm7me n speak to us . We find our sense 
cerceptions related to one another as sign a nd meaning .*~ 
I n his early Essay towards a new Theory of Vision he 
attempts to show that we do not see three -dimensional 
space , and that distance is an infe rence we are led to 
make because of the constant assoc iation of certain 
visual experiences with tactuul or locomotive experiences , -
I 
\1st Dia l . 401 
*,Sir i s Sec t . 154 
*~Commonplace Book 40 
* Siris 254 , 258 , 259 
*.r .Alciphrc~l IV - 10 , 12 1st Dial. 416 
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that the rel ation between the visual signs of outness and 
the real distance which they signify is in all cas~s 
arbitrary and discovered through experience . This theory 
that distance is invisible was a real contribution to 
psychology, and has been accepted by most psychologists 
since his day. Visible ideas he then interprets as the 
langu ~1 ge whereby the governing spir i t on whom we depend 
informs us what tangible ide~s he is about to imprint upon 
I 
us . * "The set rules or est e. blished _methods wherein the 
Mi nd we depend on excites i n us the ideas of Sense are 
called the laws of nature, and these we learn by expe r ience , 
wh ich teaches us that such and sue ~ ideas are at tended 
with SLt ch and s uch other ideas i u the ordinary course 
of things. This~ives us a sort of foresight which enables 
us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And 
without this we should be eternc.tlly at a los s ; v;e could 
not knew how to act . "* :t 
Berkeley is a personalist and believes that the 
universe consists of persons , *3 finite persons and one 
supreme person or God. Berkeley early recogni zes that an 
attempt to prove God ' s existence from the i 1ea of God 
is incompatible with his empiricism. It is absurd, he 
sa ;~. to argue the existence of God from his idea. ~e 
I 
~Prins. Sect . 44 
*,Prins. Sect . 30-
* Comn:onpl ace Book 59 
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have n o idea of Go d . ' Tis impossible. Then , t oo, al -
though he maintains that he is certain that there is a 
God , he also maintains that he does not pArce i ve Him, 
that he has no intuit ion of Him . Go d i s an object of 
intellectual knowl edg e .*' 
There are four main reasons for his belief in the 
existence of God . Free th i nkers, Berkele y holds, re j e ct 
moral and sp i r i tual evidence of Go d a n d insist on sense 
?. 
data.* Therein t hey err. "C onscience always SU "r\ '>oset h 
I n the secon l ..., l ace , there mu st b e a cause of natu r al 
nhenomene . "We rye r ceive a conti nu e l succession o :' i 1ea s , 
some are ane w e x cite 1 , others are chang ed or t o tally ~is-
a nn ea r. There is, there f ore, some cause of these i i eas, 
wh ereon they J euenl ani vrhi ch p r o lu ces a n d chang es the m • . , 
The caus e of i deas is ~ i nc orporeal ,activ e substan c e , or 
spirit. It is not i n our power to c hoo se what i l ea s we 
shall have; the r e f or e , we are no t the cau se of all our i d eas 
and there must be some o ther spi r it to cause them. S o s u re 
as t h ere is a s e n s i b l e worll , so s u re is t h ere a spi r it who 
c o ntai~ s it. ao l i s, ~ here f ore , the su , rem e and u ni v e r sal 
ca u.s e. 11 From my o r.n bei n g and f rom the d enenie n cy I f ind in 
myself enl my i l e As I d o by a n act of reas on necessarily i n -
nP r t he e xist Pn ~e of a God a nd of a ll 'cree t e i thi~g s in the 
mi n :i o f Go i ."-l:· ..~-
~:-· S iris 3 03 
~ Al c i ohron IV- 7 
><-' Alci ryhron I - 1~ , I II - 7 
-l<'' 3r ,'i Dial. 
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In the third place, there must be an und erstanding 
in which archetypes of ideas may exist. ~:- ' I f 1 close my 
eyes and there, therefore, no long er exists in my mind 
the vision o f a d esk , I do not believe that the d esk 
has c ea s ed to e xist, bu t I consiier that it exists in 
a 11 e t e r Il8 l , i r1 i' i n i t e min l • 
I n t h e fo urt h p l a ce, just as I i n f er the exist ence 
oa ot her nerson s fro~ t h e fee t that the y sn ea k to v "'-me;<, 
so I i n i.' er the e x istenc e o f a s u nreme s -,i r it from the 
existence of natu re as Divin e l angu age. ThP. t is, Berkeley 
argu es from the rati onality an l or i er of natur e to a belief 
3 i n i n t e l l i gence in the wo rli grounl .~< The unity of puru ose 
which makes u se of this n atu ral larqu age ca nn ot be accoun t-
,j_ 
ed f or by mechanica l principles.* 
T ne great point, however , Berkeley maintains, is 
not the fact that we prove the existence of a God, but 
how we inte r pr e t this su preme s pi r i t . * r He judges him 
to be wise, go od and powerful becau se of the regular 
trai~ or s erie s i n w hi ~h i d eas are e xcited . The admir-
able co nnF x i on o f i d e Ps s u fficiently testi f i Fs to the 
. b 
,.·isd om 8nd benevo l Pn ve o f' their Author: A co n s ist e n t, 
, , ri -<>o rm work i n~ , hP argu e s, j is nla y s the go o'in8SS and 
wis 'iom o f that g overn i ng snirit wha ~ e will con stitutes 
~f 2nd Dial. 424 
-l AJ ci ohron IV -
l S lris 242, 234 
~:-'~-Alci nhron IV-
*'Alciuhron IV-
~.s Alciphron IV -
Co~nonnlace Bo ok 65 
6,7 
5 
14 
16 
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the laws of nature . Regular and uniform order and con-
catenation are an argument of the greatest wisdom , power 
and goodness in their crea tor . 
I 
The fine mechanism of nature* and the structure 
and use o f orgar.J. zed nat ural bodies, animal and vegetable 
a rgue for the wisdom o f the supreme spirit . "A man v;ith 
his hand can make no machine so admira ble as the hand it-
self , nor can any of those motions by w~ich we trace 
out human reason appr oach the skill and contrivance of 
those wonderful m6t i ons o~ the heart, and brain, and 
other ,.i tal parts, v{r.i ch do not depend on the will of man . "* 
I n the Cor:1monp l ace Book Berkele y has · suggested that 
God is the s u.s taini ng p ov1er in the universe , - a pov·er 
on whic h man as well as phenomena are dependent. He dis-
-' 
covers that there can be vall tion without power*; that 
men are strangely i mpotent. "Man without Go d," he notes, 
"is wretcheder than a stone or tre e ; he having only the 
power to be miserable by his unperformed wil ls, these 
tJ. 
having no pov1er at all . "* The culmination of his tho Llght 
in Siris is of God, not as only a spirit or person su-
preme amon~ the spirits or persons in and thr ouRh whom 
s 
the material world is realised ,* but God as the infinite , 
omnipresent Grcund or /final sustaining Power immanent i n 
l 
I 
* Sir is 283 
*:Sir is 358 
* ~ Al ciphron IV - 5 
~ Commonplace Book 40 
* Commonplace Book 66 
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'l 
Nature and Man . 
The attributes of Uod are no t to be understood in 
quite different sense from what they signify wh en attri -
btl.ted tc man . or dif ferent f rom anything thfl t we can form 
a notion of or conce ive . As we say that God is infinitely 
above man , so shall we s a y t hat the knowledge of God is 
infinitely above the knowledge of man . We may, therefore , 
" consistentl y with what hath been premised , affirm that 
all sorts of perfection which we can conceive i n a f i nite 
spiri t are in God, but without any of that all oy which is 
found in the creatures . This doctrine , therefore, of ana-
l o~ical perfections i n Go d , or our knov.r i ng God by a nalogy , 
seems very much misunderstoo d an d misapplied by those who 
would infer from thenc e that we cannot frame any dir ect or 
proper no tion , though never so inadequate , of knowl edge or 
wisdom , as they are in the De ity ; or unders tand any more 
of them than one born blind can of light and colours . "* 
Berke ley maintains that i f the omn i present and omnipot ent 
mind of Uod can b e calle d "good" only when t he term i s 
used without human meani ng it would seem t o be a mat ter 
of indifference w}1ether we have unknowable rna tter or un-
knowable mind a t the root o~ things . 
It is evident that the argument which , f rom the facts 
of nature . proves the exist en ce of mind as the world ground 
* Alciphron Di al. 4 Sect. 21 
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does not prove the existence of an eternal, wise and 
good God . Berkeley does not adequately deduce the 
attributes of Go d from his metaphysical theory. He finds 
his metaphysical conception of a supreme mind analogous 
to the Christian idea of God and transfers to h~s philo -
sophy the attributes that he has learned to accord to 
God in his religion . The mind of phi lo sopher cannot rise to 
a more just and magnificent and at the same t i me more 
amiable idea than the Christian idea of God, he says. 
As for Berke ley 's conception of finite persons , we 
find his theory greatly modified in the cotrrse of the 
development of his phi l osophy . · In tl-Je Uommonplace Book 
he states that mi nd is only a "congeries of perceptions . 
Take away p r;rceptions a nd you take away t!1e mind . Put 
the pArceptions and you put the mind . "* This is where 
his early empiricism founded on concrete sense perceptions 
nat urally leads him and where it led Hume. He resolves 
at first to avoid the word person and to cal l the con-
c rete of wil l and understanding MI ND . Sotll is only a 
complex idea, ma de up of existence, v;i lling and perception 
in a l n r'<e sense; there fore it is 'nown and may be de -
fined . 
He very soon aba ndons such conceptions and rnai tains 
t'-lat t~e grand mistake is that we know not what we mean 
* Commonplace Book 28 
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by we or selv es or mind~ ' Tis most sure and certa in 
that our ideas are distinct fro m the mind . "Spir it i s 
on e simpl e undi vi de d active being- - a s it perce i ves 
i deas , it is called the understanding and as it pro duc es 
or otherwise operates abou t th em it is called the will . " 
The mi nd is act i ve , consid e r i n~ and choosing its ideas. 
I A perso n i s the true principle of unity, identi t y* and 
ex i stence . *1... 
As for the na ture of man; -Man ' s soul is t he image 
of her creat or, capable of noble life and havi ng a high 
sense of things moral and intAllectual . 
By pu.rely aprior i rea soning, on t1-Je other hand , 
Spinoza attemp t s to dis cover ul timate real ity . *' There 
is only one substance , s elf caused, i. e •• whose essenc e 
•I· 
involves existence ; * that o f which a conc eption can be 
. ~-
formed independen tly o f any other conception ; '~' necessarily 
L, 
i nfinite . * T. e existence of substance as its essence is 
an eternal truth . *7 
This subs tance of inf inite reality or be ing has an 
t . 1 infini t e * number o f attributes or aspects "', onl y two of 
whic h are perce i ved by tl-1r:> f ini te intellect,- namely , 
' 
*)... Commonplace Book 72 
* Siris 358 Prins . 27 
*·'on the Impr ovement of th e Unders t andi ng 36 
*;Et hics I Def . 1 
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I 
thous ht and extension . * The individual things that we 
discover in experience are manifestations of sub stance. * ,_ 
3 
Substa nce is not (cannot be) divided . * Quantity is con-
ceived by us empir i cally (Spinoza says , in th~ abstrae t , by 
the imagination ) a s finite, di visible , compounded in 
part s ; but conceived by the int ellect it is infinite, one 
J. 
and undivided . :!'= 
That one substance can have two such radically 
different aspects as thought and extension is a concept 
of apri ori reasoning, a result of the desire to overcome 
Descartes' dualistic metaphysics . It may be asked how 
substance thinking and substance extended can be one 
· and the same substance, but such at least is Spinoza ' s 
concept . ':'here i s parallel ism b ntween the world of ex-
t ension and the wor l d of thoug. t. We shall find the saa1e 
order, or one and the same chain o-t' causes , that is, the 
same thi ng s following i n either cas e . A thought is 
limited by another thcught, a mode of extension b.y another 
mode of extension , but a body is not limited by thought, 
s 
nor a thought by body . * "The actual being of ideas 
owns God as its catl.Se only in so far as he is consider ed 
a s a thi nking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded 
' 
*:1. Ethics I I Prop .. 1 and 2 
*, Ethics I Prop. 16 
*.._ Ethics I Prop . 12 and 13 
~Ethics I Prop . 15 note 
Ethics III Prop .. 2 
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in any other attribute; that is , the ideas beth of 
the attributes of God and of particular things do not 
own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) 
or the thinp:s perceive4_, but God himself in so far as 
I 
he is a thinking thing ." * "The modes of any given attri -
bute are caused by God in so far as he is considered 
through the attribute of which thAy are modes, and not 
in so far asjh~ is co nsidered through any other attribute . 
Henc e the actual bel ng of things w!1i ch are not modes 
of thought does not follow from the divine nature be-
cat1se that nature has prior knowledge of the thi ngs . 
Th·ngs r epresented i n ideas follow and are derived from 
their particular attribute in the same manner and wi th 
the same necessity as ideas follow from the attribute of 
1. 
thought . "* 
Spinoza recognizes two sorts of causality ; the causal 
dependence of mode on mode and the immanent causality 
of God or Stlbstance. The modes of extension form a chain 
of interconnected membe:cs .*3 Each mode has its efficient 
.1-
cause in some other mode . * Similarly each particular 
idea follows from ano the r particular idea . There seems , 
however , to be no idea of activity i n Spino za ' s theory 
of efficient causatic n. Sci entific explanati on would 
*~ Ethics II Prop. 5 
* Ethics II Prop. 6 
*:Ethics I Prop . 8 Notes 3 and 4 
* Ethics I Prop- 28 
- 4 2-
se em t o be a be tter term for the relation of one mode 
t o i ts subsequent . At the same time, no mode could 
exist were it not for the permanent underlying reality 
t o v.rhi c h all things bel on~ and of which all are stat es. 
All things are determined , · caused by, follow from the 
nature of substan ce, not in the sense that substance 
is an external, efficient cause , but ln the sa:cJ.e way in 
which equal sides follow from the nature of an eq uiang ular 
triangle.* 
I 
That the all-that - there- i s ( Spinoza ' s initial con-
cept of substance) is a One manifested in its parts, 
Spinoza never really establishes. His conception of God, 
however, is as follows: God, or substance of infinite 
"- ... 
attributes, necess arily exists, * unchangeable , pP.rfect . * 
J. " 
He is th e cause of all things , * not the transi ent but 
indwelling cause . "There is no thing in itsel f external 
.f 
to God . "* God is a thinking- being who can think an infinite 
number of t1'1ings i n an infinite nllmber of ways . *(. God is 
a f r ee bei ng in that he is self-determined . Yet he acts 
solely by the necessity of his own nature; He is not an 
absolute ruler whoso only law is his own will . * 7His actions 
*' ~Ethics II Prop. 49 Note , 2 
~Ethics I Prop. 11 
**Ethics I Prop. 11 note 
~- Ethics I Prop . 29 
*~ Ethics I Props. 18 and 24 
* Ethics II Prop. 3 
*
7 Ethics II Prop . 3 
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are not directed by a will that can even be supposed 
I 
mutable * -acting solely by the necessity of his own 
nature , there is before him no choice . * 
Berkeley later maintained that to attribute goodness, 
etc., to God only when the term is used without hu.man 
meaning makes the conception of God so abstract that it 
would have no meaning . Spinoz a attributes intellect 
and wil l to God, but insists that such intellect and 
wil l "wotlld perforce be as far apart as the poles from the 
3 human intellect and ·wil l . " * Carried away by pas s ionate 
aversion to vicious anthropomorphism Spinoza denies the 
likeness of divine and human int ,.., lligence, a denial , ho w-
ever , that is inconsistent with his teaching that fi nite 
phenomena are expressions of the divine natur e . 
Spinoza 's method of rat i onalism fails to find any 
real personal! ty in the finite modes of existence. Inr s-
much as all modes ar e but manifestations of the one sub-
, J.-
stance,"' they have no independent i ndividuality. In so 
far as the mind has inadequate ideas it is passive ; in 
so far as it has adequate ideas it is active. Spinoza 
imulies that the mind is a conscious center of activity 
for by idea he states that he means the mental conception 
wh ich is formed by the mind as a thinking thing , and adds 
*~Ethics I Props. 32 and 33 Note 2 
\Ethics I Pro-p. ll Corol. & note 
* .. Ethics I Prop. 17 Corol . 2 note 
* Ethics I Prop . 25 corol . 
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a note to the effect that he says "conception rather 
than perception, because the word perception seems to 
i mply that the mind is passive in respect to the ob-
ject; whereas concepticn seems to express an activity 
o f t h e mind • "* ' 
According to Spinoza's theory mind is but points 
of consciou~ness. Such words as intellect and will are 
mere compendious expressions for the sum of our single 
acts of affirmation or denial which in their turn are 
identical with our s.i.ngle ideas of things . Of these 
ideas each is brought up by this or that antecedent 
•• .< 
one, itself dependent on a prior . * 
Spinoza ' s theory gains intelligibility by his im-
plication that there is more to mind than disjointed 
:?> 
.. 
ideas. He speaks of man's thinking~of the mind's being 
able t o contemplate itself, of the mind's form ing con-
.j. 
ceptions . * "The mind both in so far as it has clear 
and distinct ideas and also in so far as it has confused 
ideas endeavors to persist in its being for an i ndefinite 
period and of thi s endeavor it is conscious." 
Reality and perfection are for Spinoza synonymous 
terms . *~ It is the nature of everyt hing to endeavor~o 
pers is t in its own being.* (, Van Vlot en points out that 
*~Ethics II Def .. 3 Explanatton 
*,Martineau - Spinoza pas e 161 
*~ Ethics II Axiom 2 
* Ethics II Def. 3 Explanation 
*'Ethics II Def. 6 
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it is the great distinction of.' man that by following 
the lines of his own n ture he can reach e.xcellence . 
It is plain ho wever " that man is dis turbed i n many ways 
by outward causes and like waves of the sea driven by 
opnosite winds , knov1ing nothing of the issue and of 
our fate."* ' It is possible , thoug h, that by the attain-
ing of adequate ideas, man can become free :t'rom the domi -
nation of his pas s ions . 
There are in the Comr:1cnplace Book several notes 
that indicatB that in his early ethical theory Berkeley 
was considering Locke ' s theory of ethics as a demonstrative 
). 
science . * He apparently , however, rejects the Lockean 
theory of ethics early as we find no suggestion of such 
a theory after the Principles, no mention of the possi -
bility of a mathematical science of ethics . 
He t urns to an empirical approach, built on the 
theory that pleasu.re and self - regard are the Sllpreme mo-
tives of human condLlct , a nd that there is no distinction 
between profit and pleasure. The laws of our nature make 
objects more or lAss pl ~asant . *~ We do not make objects 
more or 1 ess plea.san t , we find them so. Plea.sur e, then , 
*u. is the only good; sensual pleasure the s umm urn bonum . 
Sensual pleasure, qua pleasure, is g ocd and desirable 
*~Ethics III 59 Sc ho l . 
*~Commonplace book 39 and 41 
*~Commonplace Book 68 
* Comc.onplace Book 4 7 
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by a lwise man. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not qua 
pleasure but qua pain , or cause of pain , or (which is 
the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure . 
Alth ough Berkeley thus, early , formulates a 
hedonistic theory o±' ethics he almost immediately strikes 
at its roots because in building his scale of values 
he makes his ul timate criterion reside in character 
which makes one klnd of :pleasure superior to another.* ' 
He draws a distinction between the lower pleasures en-
joyed by the brutes who are led by the dictates of sense 
and appetite and those that should be considered higher 
by rna.n vri th his intellect, reason and a higher instinct 
and nobler 1 i-f e.. In the scale of pleasures the lowest 
" are sensual delights,* which are succeeded by the more 
enlarged views and gay portraitures of a lively imagina-
tion , which give way to the sublimer pleasures of reason, 
which discover t~e causes and designs, the frame , con-
3 
nection and s ;;,rmmetry* of thinfSS and fill the mind with the 
contemplation of intellectual beauty, order and truth . 
He also suggests that in valuing good we reckon too much 
on the present and our own. "How 1 i ttle of human pleas ure 
J 
consists in actual sensation and how much in prospect . "* 
He also suggests that we must judge value by its highest 
~ Alciphron II 13 , 14- 18 
*3 Siris 330 , 294 
*.,Commonplace Book 62 
* Alciphrcn II - 18 
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form of development . 
' He finds that natural pleasures* are universally 
sui ted as well to the rational as the sensual part of 
our nature. All pleasures that delight our senses 
such as the bea tlt ies of nature and art are worthy , 
but the '•pleasure which naturally aff:'ects a human mind 
with the most 1 i vely and transporting touches , I ta.ke 
to be the sense that we act in the eye of infinite wis-
dom , power and goodness that will crown our virt uous en-
deavors here v.rith a hap piness hereafter, large as oar 
desires and lastin~ as our immortal souls . " 
He lays great stress on the ':'he 
institution of religious men altar and 
wise as hims elf is necessary 
Go d ' *~ finds it goo d for us to worship 
a.3-~inds the Christian r eligion valuablef 
In turning from a subjective to an objective theory 
of value he abandons h1s hedon ism .. "What should hinder 
but there may be in nature," he says, "a true difference 
between l'ice and virtue , althou.gh it require some de-
d 
gree of re flexion and judgment tc observe it?""' 
The summum bonum, however. he admits cannot be mere 
temporal hap p iness . · It cannot be confined within the 
condition of time . 
*~ Dial. I - 379 
~ Alciphron Dial. 4 Sect. 25 
*~ Alciphron Dial. 5 Sect . 5 
* Alciphrcn Dial. 2 Sect. 15 
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In deciding on the supreme good it is necessary to 
take the whole of life into account . *' The general 
happiness of mankind is a greater good than the private 
happiness of one man, or of some certain men. Reason-
able creatures were made one for another; and , consequent -
ly , man ought not to consider himself as an independent 
individual whose happiness is not connected with that of 
other men; but rather as a part of a whole,· to the common 
good of which ?e ought to conspire, and order his ways 
and actions suitably, if he would live according to 
nature. "In a system of spirits, subordinate to the wil l 
and under the direction of the Father of spirits. govern-
ing t'1-lem b;y- lav;s. and conducting them b,y methods sui table 
to wise and good ends there will be great beauty. "*" EteJ.~nal 
happines s is guaranteed only by Gode Hence self l ove 
lays down the rule that men act in conformity with the 
will of God. The existence of God is t~erefore required 
by morality as it is by knowledge . 
Berkeley also acknowledges the existence of an abso-
lute standard of morals. "What should hinder but there 
may be in natu.re a true difference between vice and virtue , 
although it require some degree of reflexion and judgment 
to observe it?" For distinguishing goodness or happiness 
that is real from transitory we must refer actions absolutely 
' ~ Alciphron Dial. 1 Sect. 16 
* Alciphron Dial . 3 Sect. 11 
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t o pri·1ci ples that are i mmutable . Be rkeley takes it 
for gran ted that the1 e are moral l aws whi ch carry an 
eternal obligation . nere we f i nd Berkeley at his high-
est in ethical theory - in his i nsistenc e that moral 
truth is apprehended by reason. Natural laws , he says , 
may be deduced by purest reasOi1.. They are div i ne . The 
system of moral laws is a system of natural la~s and 
have t h eir chara c te r . It is their tenl enc y to 9r omot e 
ha ppines s that is the c r it ~ r i on of good and it is t h e 
will o f Go d that man should see k the happines .:; of ALL. 
In Berkeley's ~evelopment fro .n h ed onism, God s olv e s the 
p roblem of a lt ru ism versus egoism. Man must c onform to 
the will of Go :l L~ h e is to have e ter nal ha npines s . To 
kn ow t h e truth is t o have God ' s i de a s , so in t h e :noral 
wor l -.1 we na v e the moN: l l aws , .. hich 'l''e ca n learn by signs 
end rPc~gnize t h e voi o e o f G o~ i n the o r l erly nr ono r tion 
I 
~~ ~o rF l nhPn~mene . Mor8 l ity is i n voliti on . * To i o the 
~ · t ha e the s a me "' 1.11 as Go i Human S'1 i r it s fin i g oo l 1 s 0 v -· : 11 • _ • 
the crite r ion o f gooi a ni ba j i n the S'1 i r it who hol i s all 
truth anl reality tog e ther. 
Th e beauty ~ r vi r t ue ~ lon e is no t a s u fficient moti e 
with mank i n i to the nracti c e of it.~:-"- T l1.~ h o -p e o f' reward 
anl fear of nunishment are t l1e r e fore hi g i1ly ex pe d ient to 
cast the bala n ce o f ~ lea san t _ and ~ro fitable on t h e s i d e 
-;:
1 Common :J la ce Book 36, 70 
-;;-"'- Alc i ph~on ll I - 4 
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of virtu e anJ t here~ery mu ch 
human society. / 
co ;- -• u ce t o the ben e f it of 
The problem of evil is not a ve r y re a l Dr ob lem f or 
Berkeley, s o far as the phases of it he touches upon se em 
t CJ i ni icat e . l~lci phron ' s -:Jr oblem o f re conc iling s o much 
VI CE with the wis l om and g oo l ness of the su pr eme monarch 
he scarc el _,c touches .~~· As f or natural evils, h e suggests 
t hat the r e are i mper f ections in nature, bu t t hat it may 
suit vrith t i1e o r le r 'J f' t l1in gs , t he st ru ct·ure of the uni-
ve :cbe o r 1.. ne encl s of Prov i d P. n c e t hat ther P. shou l d be.~<-"'--
~xc e ss e s , ~ e ~ ects ani t h e c on t r a ry qu~ lities consryire to 
3 
thP. ll P~,-ty Pnd har-:1-cm y ':'::' the 1·-or l i • .;< Th e ve r y blemi s hes 
2n-'1 r1e~ect s o~ n a tv re ma ke an a.gre eable s ort o [' va ri ety 
an i augmen t the beau t y o r t he rest of the creation , as 
sha d es i n a ,ictu re serve to set off the brighter and 
Ll 
mo r e e n l ig ht e ne l Darts·* I n ju ~ing as to whether t h i ngs 
are gooi or b a i , Be rkeley f airly i ns ists, it is necessary 
that vi e get a v iew of the whole i f we are to mak e a ri g ht 
!,-judgment.* He who stand s close to a pala c e 8a r l ~r~ly 
111aKP ~right j ul,; (-mt of th8 architec ~ ure and symmetry of 
the several parts. 
In the matter of real natural evils he can only 
su ggest that thP steady observation of natural laws, 
e ve n tao~gn i t involves individual hardship i s of s u f-
f icient va l u e t ha t t h e Au thor o f Nature will not i eviate 
~;Al c i nhron IV - ?.;) 
~~s i r i s 8 56 ' 8 5 7 
,)_s • · " 6 ...., ~; 1rlS <:- G 
- 5 1-
,L 
~ Prins . 152 ~ 
*Alci Dhron IV- 2 3 
how wise or ber evolen t soever it may be thought by 
fo~ lish man to j o so. The gen eral laws of nature are 
sui te ·i, have an inherent BDtness to promote the good 
of al l ; yet for all t hat it is plain, he admits, that 
plagues, famines, earthquakes, and an infinite variety 
of pains and sorrows arise from t h e u ni f orm s teady ob-
serva ti on o f.' those general laws. Were, however, natural 
laws not steadily observed man would be at a loss to 
I 
regulate his acti ons.* 
~ae inCinitely wise and good lawgiver, he also argues, 
is not to be blamed fo r particu lar evils that ari s e from 
t'l-]_~=~ trBT'sg;ression of' som P , b1~ t acciientall'r from the ob-
servation o f.' other g oo:l laws. Causal combinations of events 
and voluntary action s of.' ri r ite in l ivi ~uals also cause 
evil i n the worl i . Then, too, ma n is a free agen t, and may sin , 
sin consisting in the internal ieviati on of the will from t h e 
laws of moral reason. 
Berkel8y also makes the interesting suggestion t hat 
the laws of nature have an inherent ap~ness to promote the 
gooi of all in the greatest d egree the present circumstances 
ani capacities of human nature will permit. At t he same 
time, we cannot judge of the parts without k no wing the end 
2 
or purpo s e ear which the \•rhole is planned.* The present 
' ~r .::iir is 25 6 
~/" .Al c i nhron VI - 1 6 , 17,18 
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worll, Berkeley believes, is not :iesigned or adapted to 
I 
make rational ::, ouls happy,;< anyway, and '.'! e must not judge 
it from that point of view. All things are made fo~ the 
Supreme Goo.i , all thinrss tend to that good . 
The real solu tion o ;:-. the problem f or Berkeley li e s in 
his belief i n im~o rtali ty.*~ "It were inconsistent with the 
wlsdom o f Go.i b y suffer i ng B retaliation o f' f rat.d, ryerJury, 
"'1" the likP rm the hPad of of'fenlers, t o "'lUnish one trans-
gression by another; so on the ot her hend it were i nc on-
sistent with His justice to leave the gooi ani inn ocen t a 
hanless sacrifice to the micked. Go i , t h ere f ore, hath 
a ryuointed a day of ret •·ibution in another li r e e n d i n this 
·we have His grace P.nl a good consc ience for our su.,.-..,ort. 
We should not, t h ere f ore, repine at the Divine la~s, or 
she~ a frowardness or impatience of those transient suf-
fering s they accidentally expose us to, which, however 
grating to flesh anl blood will yet seem of small moment, 
if we compare the littleness and fleetingness o f this 
present wor ll with the glory and eternity of the next." 
" • 3 berke ley reje~ts the notion o r necess 1ty.* In nature, 
Loo, thP constAnt orler means rational freelom, not ne- · 
~Pssity. I n ~riting to Perciv Pl o f the Treatise; Be rkeley 
states its 1esi gn as among other thin ·rs the r econc ilia-
tion of Go i 's forek n ow1 e Jge and the freelom o f man . He 
I 
* Alcinhron V - 5 
*
1 A1ciuhron III - 11 ~ .. ~ Comm~n--11a ce Boo k 58 
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maintains the doctrine of freedom of ~ill on three groun~s; 
we think V'e are fre e ; freedom is implied in the e xistenc e 
I 
a moral and responsible a g ent1r, that is, t h e concept of 
blame i mp li es fre edo m; its denial ma y be justly said to un-
ninc?;e Gfle principles of mora lity. 
Itt Tis an absur~ qu e st ion ," he says, "whi ch Lock e nuts 
... 
~hPt~Pr ms n be rree t o will."* Will is at the h eer t o f 
,.,e r sona lity.f." "To ask whether a ma n ca n 1'ill eit h er siie 
is en absur i question , E'or the ,·- ord CAN -nresury--.oses volition" .-r.-
"It is self-evi i ent that the r e is s u ch a thing as motion; 
and yet the r e have been rouni nhilosouhers wh o , bEl refined 
reasoning, wou l d uniertake to nrove that there was n o such 
thing . WALKING BE roRE THEl\1 was thought the proper way to 
confute those ingenfuas men. It is no less evident that man 
is a free agent; and though , by abstrac t ed reasonings, you 
would puzzle me, and se em to prove the c ontrary, yet, so 
long as I a m conscious of my own actions, this inward evi-
~ence of p l a i n f act wil l bear me u p against all your reason-
in.~ ::; , now ev e r sub tle and refined. The confuting nlain noints 
by obscure ones may uerhens convince me of the ability of 
~r'"'ur '"lhiloso..,hers, but n ever of their tenets. ' ' ~:- .,- It is evi-
d en t t n eve ~y ma n o a common s ense, maintain s Berkeley, that 
it is the mini which c on si i ers its i l eas, cho o ses, rejects, -
~~ Si r is 2 57 
*~ Commonrylace Book 57 
~\siris 248 
*~Commonnlace Book 31 
*5 Alciph~on VII - 18 
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Ll 
I 
acts about them, and not they about it.* 
In the seconi place, man condemns himself' for some 
actions an-i approves himself for oth e r s. 11 Men impute their 
actions to t hemse lves bPcause they ~ illei them, and that 
not out of their i gno rP.ncP, but v.rhereas they have the c rm -
GPOUPnces o "' them, '"hether goal or bad. 11 *!l. The concel)tS 
of merit and demerit are meanin~less without the ryre-
suu·~o sition o f' human liberty. Finally, he st a tes, all 
those who write agair st the dignity, freedom and immor-
talit y of the human soul may so far forth be justly said 
to· unhinge the principles of morality.~~~ 
Spinoza's ethical theory on the other hand is quite 
different from Berkeley's. His is a pu rely rationalistic 
theory and he maintains that i t is not any real value of 
the things themselves but our thinking that makes the 
things about us gooi or bad. Nothing regarded i n its own 
nature can b e c a l le d perfect or imperfect. We must re-
memoer t hat a l l things which come to pass come to pass 
Pc c ording to the etern? l or jer and fixed laws of nature. 
s~in~za mai n t Ains that we do not strive for, ~ish 
for, long f or, or d esire a n y thi ng , because we deem it 
to be goo c~l , but we deem a thing goo l because we wish 
for it. This vo l untaristic theory o f goo l , however, is 
practically aband oned when S'l)inoza comoletes his ethical 
theory. In or j er to make the word goo:i stan·i for a defi-
* Alciph~on VII-20 
~~-: Gommonpla ce Book 69 
* Commonplace Book 19 
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nite o r fixe j v a l u e h r:o i e fi n es it as that which uwe cer -
tain l y J{n 01.'' to be a means o ,~' aT• r oachL'1g mo r e n early to 
the ty ""'e of human nature, wh i ch '"e have s et be fore our-
s elves." 
Man conceives a ty ,1e o f:' character hi gher than his o wn 
a n d believ es that he can acqui r e such a c hara c ter , and is 
thus led to see k f or the means v.rhi ch wil l bring him to 
this g oal, calling everything whi ch ¥ril l serve as such 
means a true g ~ oJ. The t is, Spi n oza assume s that there 
is s ome human ,g; ood s o su re and p e rma nent that .J_ t can make 
.Li i' e .soou. . Hi s furthe r assum-pt ion t ha t self-preservation 
on t h e nPrt of e v e r y man doe s not interfere with t h e h i ghest 
sPl~ - nreservati n o ~ all ot he r men makes it no ssible for him 
to ma i n tain thet gooi i s ryos itive , a ctive ; evil nega tive, 
nas s ive. Reason, he maintains, makes n o 1 ema ni s contrary 
to nature; t he re fo r e eve r y man shoul l love himsel f , should 
seek that 1"hich is usefu l to h im - that which is really 
u se fu l; shou lJ d esi r e everythi ng v·h ic h really brings men 
to g reater p erfection and should eac h f or himself enlea vor 
as f a r a s he can to pres erve h i s own b eing. 
The supreme go od is t o know abso l ute l y i nfinite being , 
the common pro pert ie s ali k e in the uart and i n the whole, 
i.e., Go i , is the mini ' s supreme ~o oi , its hi~hest activi-
ty , i ts absoluL e v ir1ue . The chief gooi is that man shoul d 
arrive at t he p~sses s ior1 o ( t h e "knov l edg e o f the u nion 
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existin g betwe en the minl an=1 the who le of nature."~;. ' 
HThe functio n o " man is to kno1.·· , to un l erstanl ; an:i the 
mi n =; ju i P-; eS nothing servic eable to itsel f es:cept what 
con:iuces to this enl, ,_,:hich CJ; ives valu e to all thin gs 
end r eceivPs it fr om n one . The more compre hens ive the 
object understooj , t he more adven tageous is the a p-ore -
hension o ;:' it. ~~ ~-..:z.. 
Sni noza , even as Berke le y , sees i n the v o r l i o f 
nature such evils as storms , Pa rthque kes , liseases , 
and no tes ti12t .t1is::,orr.vnes _,E t l to t i1e lot of p iovs and 
Lnpio u.::; a li ke . Ye t. !1i ~:> rat ior£ li sm Ga.nn~Jt re c ogn ize t hem 
as reel pr il. s . lt is , he ma intai n s, on ly the c oncept of 
t"'le-=l or.:y ··,h i::;h ha s· g iven rise to p :'"'e ju i ce s abou. t go0d 
a n d ba d , r i ght an d v.r r ong. Men persl.Je.le themselves that 
eve rything v:rhich i s created is crRateJ. for their sake , 
and t hey are, there f ore, boun~ to consi ie r as the ch ief 
qua. lity i n everyt hi ng that "which is most usefu.l to them-
selves an::l to account t hose t h ings the bes t of all which 
have the most benefi c ial eff ect on ma nk i n .l. Fu rthe r , 
they we re bound to fdrm abstra c t n otions fo r the e xplana -
tion or the nature of things, such as goodness, badne~s, 
Eve r ythin3 in na tu r e really, ho~ever , pro-
ce e ds from a sort of necessity and ~it h the utmost p er-
f ection. uNothing c omes to pass in nature which can be 
set ao wn to e. flPw t herein."~; ·t.l-
~~ • Or- t hP l mDrov emen t of the lJ n :lers tanding 6 
~-'l M P rt i neau . - SDinoza 264 
"~Ethi cs I ~n~e~i i x 79 
.;<-"Ethi c s lll Int r o iu ctiou57 _ 
~nPn Psk why i : all ro ller f rom the uerfecti on o r God 
the r e are so many imner£'ection s in nature.'' -:;' 11 Thin "" s 
are not more or less nerfect accord ing as they ie li ght 
or off en:l human senses, or accor:i ing as they are service-
ab l e, or re pugnant to mankind ." -:P "The pa s s ions o f' hat r ed , 
ang er, envy en d s o on, c onsi i ered i n t h e mselve s , f olio··· 
from t his same n e ces s ity an d e ffica cy of nature. "-::? The 
knowledge of g ood and evil i s n ot hing else bu t the e mo-
tions o f YJ leasure and pa i n i n s o far a s we are consciou s 
the reoC . " Eve r ything in so f.'ar a s it is in its e lf enl eavors 
to pers ist in its 0\'.'11 be inf!; . Pleasu r e is a passiv e state 
wherein t h e minJ nas s es to a g rea ter from a l e sser per-
f ec ..,.L ull , .Pa i r, L ... a -J ::; s s iv c sta t e v.'he re i n the min:l passes 
~PC h ma n S0 ':'Ar 8S he is n ot united with his fellm•'S 
in a soc i a l a gre8ment to ma i n t a i n a sta te , or un it ed with 
him in a s ocial organ i ~ation· v.rher e he has v o luntari ly 
given UD some o f' his ri ,;;h t s is a law unto hims e lf' and sin 
has no meaning. Sin c an arise only a s i isobel ienc e to 
t he la ws o f a state. There is n o tl1ing i n the state of 
n atur e ans wering to jus tice and inju stice. "Such i ~eas 
are ·only possible in a soc i a l st a te when it is d ec ! e ed b y 
com:non consent what belong s t o one man ani wha t to ano ther. 
J u sLic e , and injustice, sin ani merit, are e x t rins ic 
i deas, and not att r ibutes vhich iisDl a y the nature of 
c "l-f . EtniCS .L ~ppen~i x 
,t J.!.L,,u_c~ J.J..L l n tro l"L1 C ~.- i o n 
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~, n e .n.J..llu. • 11 
The f0undet i on O C> J. virtue is the enleavor t o pre-
No other criterion of ner-
fect i 0 n i s o~f er e1 ex ce~t that of amount o f being. 
Quasi mora l iistir.c tions are base:i on no con ce"tion 
of a un iversal mora l element i n man's natu r e. It is 
the founjation of virtue that eve r ything which exists 
shou l i enl eavor to e xist t o t h e greatest n ossible ext ent. 
T ne r P is no reward o f virtue; virtue is to be d esired 
for its own sake, - is its own revvard. Virtue and the 
service of God in itsel f is ha ppiness a nd perfect free-
The outcome of Snin o~a 's ra t i onAlism i s of course 
det e r .:-ti n i::; m. "'/e r eg a r·d thin :;s as c ontinge nt. mhen we 
·-lo llO l- 1<.nov: v: i12. t t he essenc e i nvolves, a uarticular exis-
tence ~nn~'>Prs to us neit her necessar'! or imnossible and , .. e 
' .l. • h t f CPll it contingent.* It 1s, h 0wever, in t e na ure o 
reason to nercei v e thin ~s t ru ly, i.e. not as contin gent 
:> 
but as necessary.~; It is onlytbrough our imag i nation 
that we cons i d.er t hin p; s whether i n resnect to t he f uture 
o r pa st as c ontingent. ncould you see the vrorli at one 
glance, under the fo rm of eternity, you would see everyt hing 
as a necessa.ry result of the vrh o le nature o f things." 
J Ethics II Prop. 49 Car o l. Note 1 
~~ Ethics I Prop . 33 
d Ethics II Prop. 44 Carol 
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Sninoza aimits with Berke ley that men thi nk them-
1 
selves free. ·:< Herein, however, Sninoza maint a ins that 
men are mistaken. Men are conscious of their volitions 
and d esires and never even d ream i n their ignorance of 
the causes which have dis posed them so to wish an:i d e-
sire . Their idea of freedom, there f ore, is simply their 
i gnorance of any cause for their acti on s.~<- 2 Man is not 
fre e. The will is not the center ot activity. '1Will 
•• lj. 
is only a particular mode o f thinking , like intellect* ; 
"therefore no volition can exist nor be conditioned to 
act unle s s it be c ~nlitioned by some cau se other than 
II J... \\ 
i L"=>e .ll' .~f · J.n tne mir~J there is no absolute or free v·i 11, 
o u. t the mind i s d e t e r m in P d to "' i sh t hi s or that by a 
~PP SP 1•·hi '3 h hP.s a lso been iet ermined by a not her cau se and 
thi s last by anothe r cause, and so on"ad in f initum.*; 
It is of course inevitable that determinism such as 
Spinoza's be the outcome o f a rationa listic system 
which deluces the na ture of the dependent modes fro m 
the in.iependent substance which can manifest its e lf 
in only one way, - thB. t is free without the pov'er of 
choice. 
This study o f the systems of nhilosophy of 
Berkeley and S ~inoz 2 , the first of whom st Brted out 
with the ideal o f empiricism, the second ~ith the ideal 
~ Ethics ~ ~ppenlix 
~? .u 1 d.i .:: ;;; .J.l Prop . 3 5 l'l o t e 
*' ~tni cs II Prop. 44 
i,":- Ethics I Prop. 32 
~ Ethics II Pron. 48 
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o f' rationalis .n , se e ms to uoin t to t he fact that neithe r 
a method. of ~ure em~i r icism no r a metho i of ab solute 
rationalism is s u fficien t to nror1uce an a dequate s ystem 
of uh iloso phy. Empiri cism alone gives isolated e xner-
iences, no knowled ge; rationalism alone "may liberate 
the ima g inations as to vrhat the world. MAY be" but it 
TI "" ver can tell what the worl'i IS. If philoso phy is 
an interpretation o f the content of rea l ity two things 
are necessary, - a knowledge o f the content of reali t y 
and its interpretation. We must look to empiricism 
f or t h e f orme r , to r ati ona li sm for t h e latter. 
~t i s , of cou r s e, i nevitable t hat eve r y philosophi-
cal s y s t Pm mus t beg i n ~·' it h somethin g ultimate. Berk eley 
nrnnnsei t n be ~ i n =it h t ne i d. eas of sense and of reflec-
tion ; e xueriences t o whi c h he be l ieved he couli re iu ce 
all other e xneri~n ce. ThesA sele cted d.ata, however, he 
found insuff icient, f or he s oon .j iscovered that there 
are e xperi en ces, realities whose e xistence he could 
not d oubt,that could not be reduced to the i d eas of 
sense and of reflection. S o to these original da ta he 
later added a kno wledge of spirit, o f s u ch non-sensati on-
al elemen ts of kno wled ge as rebtions, and the facts of 
our moral nature, i n the last t wo cases merely sug gest-
ing what Kant lat e r so thor oughly worked out. 
S Ji n oza, on the o t h er ha n d. , pro nosed as his start -
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ing point the a bstract i d.ea of the all-of-reality. This 
abstract idea, hovrever, · p r oved unf ruitful, and he :l is-
covered that he had to fill out this empty concept with 
the c oncrete data of experience. Spino~a's geometrical 
method tend s to obscure the fact that his system, after 
all, rests much as di:i Berkeley•s on the facts of i mmed i-
ate experience. Such data, however, in Spinoza's sys-
tem are much less compre hensive of the content of reality 
than are t hos e select ed by Berkeley. They inclu de none 
of t~ e illorel f act s and only by im~lications the exuerience 
'Jf self. 
The basis or all kn owleige is i n experience. As 
Bowne nuts it, "Common sens e and science must i iscover 
the f'acts, otherwise nhilosonhy has nothing to vrork 
u p on." This is the element which Berkeley clearly sees 
and emuhasizes. 
Only thus far, however, can the method of emu i r i c ism 
carry us. There is, as already noted , a se~ond element 
necessary, and that element Spinoza emuhasize i . If' the 
u ni ver s e does not admit of rational constru cti o n there 
can be no real knovr led s;e. S n inoz a emphasiz es the fact 
that Bowne points out, n 2mely, that Min:i must have the 
key to t ne univers e in itself; otherwise we cannot know 
t .le universe as it i s . S ninoza's uroblem was to fi n d a 
f.'ir s t nrinc ipl e 1'•h ich would e x nlain the universe; in the 
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light o f which the individual facts of experience might 
be understooi. It was one of his weaknesses that his 
suggestion of substance or infinite unity on which all 
things rest was not organic but abstract. Berkeley·, 
too; soug ht a first principle in the light of which the 
facts of experience might be interpre ted , th~first 
principle for him bein ~ the Supreme Spirit. 
!~either Spinoza mr Berke l ey , ho'?'ever, recognized 
clePrl y the fu nction o? reason in builiing up kno~ le ig e. 
I~ his early theory Be r keley ma kes the mind pa~~ive, all 
known objects mere comDle x es of sensation s. As he wo rked 
out his system, however, he began to recognize the non-
sensuous f actors of kr: owledge and to note the activity of 
the min d , but it remained for Kant to show that the mind 
must actively construct knq wledge for itself. Spinoz a 
states that the mini is active in knowledge. Yet as a 
moie o£ a divine attri bute, definite i d eas of definite 
things that are caused by preceding .iefinite ideas, 
mind in Spinoza's system is really given no true a ctivity. 
In epistemology both Berkeley and S pinoza recog-
nize tnat knowi n g alwa.ys relates itself to a content 
wL1ich the kno~:'7ing act .i 0 es n 0t ma ke . " There is in the 
... re-rv i 1ea 0 ' ou r knov.ring presupposition o i' something 
existing a part from the knowing as a mental act. " We 
must start with an assertion of the existence of an ob-
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jective world . If the assertion of its existence be de-
nied there is no other way in which its existence can be 
reached. Berke ley's em~ iricism cannot d iscover an ob-
jective world, or Spinoza's rationalism find any formal 
proof of its existence. Berpkeley's concept of nature 
as a rationa l or~er paral le l to our subjective thinking 
wa:::. one of his chief contributions to philosophy. 
In metaphysics Berke ley's is the more comprehensive 
s ~rstPm i n thPt,in al'iition t o the existence of the .exter-
nal worl i and thought, he recognizes the reality of ner-
sons. Moking personality the fundamental reality he can 
logically admit the e xistence o f fi n ite and in f inite 
thought. S.pinoza, from the given data of thought and 
matter cannot logically deduce the existence of spirit. 
Berkeleyts early empiricism, based on sense peroe 9tions, 
f ailed to d iscover persons. As Hume later pointed out, 
there is no sense perception of a self. Equally fu tile 
was it for Spinoza to attempt to deduce the exi stence of 
a self from thought or matter. As Berkeley soon saw, 
the facts o f expe rienc e mus t be enlarged to admit the ex-
per~en~e of a selt . There is no wa y of establishing 
the existence of a. self e x cept that of direct appeal to 
c'!rs ci nu snes s. Only by im,li cation has S ni noza's sys-
tern nlace for the existence of a self. 
Both Berkeley and Snir oza recognize that causation 
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is in play as the ground of physical cha n ge. Rationalism 
must have it as a unifying principle; empiricism can dis-
cover no impres s ion of cause, but it does discover i n the 
active will o ~' persons an exueri ence o f DO\'.' er that leads 
it to loca~e causat ion , not in the phenomena themselves 
ouL in the bese l energy beyo r 1 , - in the will o f a Supreme 
As Be rke ley points out, Emuiricism does not give us 
a God. Nor doe s rati0nalism, reasoning from the abstract 
i d ea of the all-of'-reality have any real concept to of f'er . 
Reasoning from the fac ts of the natural world lePdS to 
nothing more than the existence of a p ovrerful sni r it. 
Berkeley, however, makes a suggestion that we may argue 
from the facts of morality to Go d , - a suggestion that 
proved most fruitful to later thinkers. 
It is in ethical theory that there is perhaps seen most 
clearly the inadequ acy o? absolute rationalism. All is le-
terminism, moral .iist i nct i ons J isapuear. Such a worlj is 
noL- ~..1e wor lJ. Lilat I S . T he exueriences of free will, of 
6 ood and evil, demP-n..i an internretation, not an exnlaining 
At thP same time there is as deep a truth in Suinoza's 
claim that the facts of experience cannot be isolated and 
called goo :l or evil in themselves, but that they must be 
viewed in the light of the whole, as in Berkeley's thesi s 
that the 1istinctions between good and e vil are real, ingrained 
in the ve Ty nature of the universe and cognizable by man. 
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ABSTRACT 
Suinoza's i i eal was thP i d eal or rationalism; 
Berkeley's o f' empi r i c ism. Suin oza's age was an age 
that had suureme belief in the omni notence of reason 
and imulicit confidence in the scien tific method or Galil e e. 
S:J i nGz a does not '1ronose to fi nd the all-inch:sive hy-
p o Gnes is from ~hi ch all thi ng s are to be j e i uce j by 
an exa minAtion o~ i nd ivi j uals. Such an abs tra ~ t iGr 
=0uld -ot g ive the essence o f reAlity. His ~ o stu-
late, t he n , from mhich all mv st be de:luced is the one 
of a si r: gle substance embraci ng all the in -1ivilua.ls 
in the universe. This subs ta r- ce he described as 
havi r g two as1ects - as embracin g in uniGn i ~1eas 
and their objects. From t h e hynothesis of substance 
n o anrio r i reason ing could describe or tell what mus t 
be the world that IS. The i rd ivi dual manif'estatior s 
of s ubstance are then the field of emnirical scien ti:'ic 
inquiry. I n so far has the methoi or rationalism been 
ina i equate as the s t rict method of nhilosoDhy. 
Berkeley's age, Q j the other hand was more critical 
of t ne ;net l1oJ or lzn ov· ing, an .i Berke ley f' i n ds the only 
s af e starting noint fdr kno~le i ge in the concrete data 
~r sense exnerience. ~or such emni r icism abstract 
i.ieas are r o clue to reality. Berk eley Joes not find 
sense exnerience ultimate reality, but refuses to ac-
cent rna te r ial substance as u 1 tima te. Such a nos tu late 
he find s i naiequateas exDlanation o ~ all the f acts of 
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exuerience. He reasons from the ~on c rete sense e x -
ryerience iata to a reality of sryi r ituel nature. Berk eley 
then finds the method of strict emryiricism ina i e qu ate 
to locate the cause or ultimate nature of thi ngs. 
In hi s eLhical the o ry Berke ley resorts to the methoi 
oi."' pu re r::: ti ona l i ::, m. 
In P"'l i ste'nol ogy Berkelf" y 's em-,i r ici '""m leass him 
to ~on i s~ , ~here object a nd sensati on ar~ the sa me . 
There is, h 0wever, a groryin g toward s iuPl ism, be-
caus e of a f e eli~ g of ina i equacy of mo n ism to PCOou r t 
for our b e lief in the existence or obje c ts when n ot 
"1ercei ve i by cimrs elves, an i his the ory o C 11 notion s ·of 
sni r it, anl re lati ons , etc., which some how heve ~ean -
ing and 'JO i n t to something other tha n the~s e lves . 
HF reas ons to a bPl i e f i n s ~i rits, - other fi~ i te 
uersons end one i nf i n i te ne rso n. His c r ite r ion of 
tr1.~ th is 1J e rhaps most g e n erelly tha t of coherence . 
Of sense ne r ceuti ~r s i t is c l earress , d i st i n ctness ; 
- · coherence in 
of t ne conr ectio ns of sense ..,erc e nt i on s/ex~er i enC P i 
ot ~ or sciousness , i ~tu i L i on ; o~ inf er en~e s from sen se 
ex perience, rttel l i g ibi lity , c onb istency ani comryre-
he:rs ivPr ess ; of more l l aw -,ure reas on or .,ra g ~natic 
tests vrhjch yi P l l the sa me r e uult as do es ·"'ure reas o n ; 
o f religious beli ~f~ , .., r obability. 
Suin oza ' s e~ist e mology i s iual istic, - i ~ eas ~gree 
wiLh thPir object s , his ex..,lanation t hereo f that they 
are both on ly asuects of ONE r eel it y ,- a theory o f 
')ara l l Pli sm. As to whet her the hu ma n min l i s an i iea 
t ha t g o es with or kn ows tne huma n bo i y i s not clea r . 
His cr i te r i m of tru th i s to be sought i n t he i n tPl-
le c t itself. lna J ecu at e i i eas ere f alse, are i n 
the reRlm o ~ t he i ma g i n ation a nd are re su lts of t he 
~as ~ iv it y o ~ mi~ l . Ai equa te i lea s re,res ~~ t t he PS-
senJe of t ni n~ s , e re the re~ul L ~f the act i vity of the 
;·,1i rL.1 ; 0a r ry the i r ov:r e v i dP·nce v: it h the m, are Jl e::>r 
~ T' ~1 d i s t i n ~ t P n J hn v e t " b e b e 1 i e " e - . The ri 9;ht 
orleri· co; 'J:' thes e ai e q1 .at e i le as i r log i cal co gen cy 
const itu tes i n t Plle ct and re~r~ 1 uc es t he o r ~ P r of 
nat urB l n ecessity. 
By t ne me t hoi of em, i r i c i sm Be rke l ey 1i sc overs 
tv o kin ~ s of rea lit y , - i l e es whose esse is ,e r ci..,i, 
t he wor l i of a t ure; Pn d S"1i ri t wno se esse is ..,erc i.., ere . 
By J e _h; ct i or fr om thes e Jata of e xry e r ience he c omes 
t 0 a bslief i n t he e xistence of other s irits (fin ite) 
and one suDreme S"1irit. He fini s in _e xne r ienc e no 
r eal cause e xc e Dt SDirit; the c onn ec t i on o f i i eas is 
not a connec t.. ion of' en' " " 8nd ef:f'0c t b11:- of sign and 
t hing si gnL'ie~, - nature is but 9ivine la.nguage . 
ri e be l ieves in t ne e xis te nce of a ~u ..,r ~ mP ~ ..,irit as 
c?use of y;eture l "1henomena, a nd as min i su.., , lying 
t he ')ivi re l Pr. g11Bge o f na Lu r "' ; the i -•ea of t he n~ ture 
of this su.., r Fme s, i r it he tran srylan ts ifr om hi s t h e-
· ~tt_8 r~· t' -
ology to his meta ~ hyslc s , 1\ a Pmry 1n g; to .., r ove His 
wis iom , goo i ness and nower from t he or i erlir ess ~nd 
harmony of nat u re; a ni from the stru ctu re a nd use o f 
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biolog ical phenomena. 
His early ~ m1i r ici sm led him 
to finl r o thing to mi n :l b 1J t a c o ng~ r ies of ... er ce""ltior. s , 
b li t with t he brea k i r~ away f rom 1u r e em, i ric ism he 
r1nJs roo~ i n h i s sys tem for ryers ons as s imryl e un i i-
vi ded !" C tivP. b ein;;s - tr1; e "P r i nG i ryles of un ity, iie "' ti-
3 -,i oza b y ..,urPly P ..,ri or i rea sor i n g f ormulates a 
mo r istic the o ry of meta1hysi c s . There is one s u bstance , 
kn owh un ·1er two attribu tes a nd me n i f'e sted i n the i ··· , i-
viiual b o i ies and i i e es of e x1eri en ce. Each ~o ~ e 4e-
ueni s on o r has its ~f ~ icien t cause i n some ot h Pr mole , 
a l l being d etermined by the nAture of the one s ubsta r ce . 
His c o nce1tion o f Goi i s harily more than of abstract 
substa n ce al h ou gh he mP i n tain s t ha t he is a free thi 
ing bein ~ . He cgn form n o i ynamic c ~ n ce .., ti on o f' 1er-
sons by t he :nethoi of "'JUre rati •,ra lism , but gain s in-
te lli g ibility for his :i esc r i.., tio~s by h i s im..,licati on 
oi.' 5 cer: tF:r of C'lrs ~i r:,u:.:- activ i ty F il. i ch in t h eory he 
ue T: iPS . 
I n et ll.i ·JS Berkeley attem-,ts tei f0 rmulate a hP·i o-
i.- -
" 
11 ist ic the'lry bu t s tri kes at t he r o, ts of h is he lonism 
by buil i ing un a qualitat iv e i ~ stea d of a qu a n titat iv e 
scale o f v a l-c e s, rylacing the chara c ter vah-.es a bove 
h e s ~ n sual nlea sure v alues. He ge ~ s so fe r a way f rom 
h is il.e:io r i sm as to m~i nt a i n t ha t t her e is ~"' ~' absoh•t e 
s t anlarl o f valves, tha. t moral 1l:a "\1.r s =a re l.ln i.versal a nd 
:l i scoverable by DU re ree son . The value of hr vi n <; P 
_.L.-
rational universe more than offsets the evil of the c:elami-
ties that arise from havin g nature take its course. The real 
~roblem of evil 1oes not seem to be ad~quately realised , but 
for cne mos t part , so far as it is recognizel, it is solved 
uy r. ne cor. c ept of imnortality anl future squaring of' accounts. 
~ PrkFlPy m2intains t ~a t man is free , that the mi n ~ consi i ers 
ani c ho~ses its ileas. 
S~inoza 's rationalism leads him to 1iscount t he reality 
of evil an1 maintain that the concents o f gooi ani evil P.X ~ress 
no n~sitive quality of things. In so far as we talk about 
gooi ani evil we are voluntarists, the objects of our d esire 
being termed goo l . Suinoza optimistically as s umes that t h ere 
is some human gooJ. so s u re anj !ermanen t that it ca n make life 
goo.i,- that supreme good ,the kn owing of absolu tely i r finite 
. being, thereby kf·owing things unier the asrye c.t of eternity. 
There is for him no uroblem o f evil, - nothing can be set 
down to a flaw in nature, ani al1 is letermin.ed by that '1er-
f e eL uBLu.r·e. Everything enieavors t'J ryersist in its being, 
.L.L so far as its end eF.lvor is baffled there is lacking to our 
~hnu"ht thP nositive concention or gooi. Virtue has no re -
ward, but is its own reward. There i s , or course, no pl~ce 
for freedom of choice in ~uinoza 's syst em. 
Neit h er strict emniricism nor absolute rationalism a lone is 
an aiequate method in uhilosonhy. If philosophy is an i nter-
uretation or reality, t vro thi ngs are necessary ,- the iata of 
exnerience and its inter nretation. Em•iricism must furn is h 
the concrete facts of e xnerience, rati~nalism the i n ternret2tion. 
Albee, Ernest 
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